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"What I know most surely about morality and the duty of man I owe to [soccer]" 
-Albert Camus 
This paper is dedicated to my outstanding and beautiful mother, my inspirational and 
warm-hearted feather, and to my r~markably bright and compassionate brother. I love 
you all and hope we continue our adventures together. Thank you to all friends for 
supporting me and making these four years an incredible experience. Enjoy! 
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Soccer is a sport. It is also a unifying force that, in its most positive incarnation; can 
topple authoritarian leaders, reduce police brutality, and indirectly repeal oppressive 
government policies. People's love for soccer has organized fans into powerful political 
actors, known as supporter groups. Originating in Sampdoria in 1969, supporter groups 
(also known as "Ultras", or "firms") have a distinct presence within their club's 
neighborhood. Unlike hooligans, these groups hold meetings, organize community 
programs, and coordinate stadium experiences. Supporter groups are separate from the 
club, but dedicate themselves to the welfare of their team and community. More 
importantly, most groups have horizontal power structures that distribute power equally 
among members. Ultras are encouraged to openly discuss issues and participate in 
orchestrated programs. Supporters learn democratic principles of citizenship and public 
participation in these firms. Especially in non-democratic states, soccer gives agency to 
individuals, who can control the future of their organization. By teaching democratic 
values, strong civil society can instigate democratization movements in authoritarian or 
non-democratic regimes (Newton, Bernhard). 
Despite its capacity .for social change, soccer remains one of the least researched 
subjects in political and sociological literature on civil society and democratization. As 
the world's most popular sport, soccer receives limited academic recognition because of 
its populist and widespread appeal; for many, soccer is a game, not a sociopolitical 
phenomenon. Soccer's power to unite and divide people makes it an underdeveloped 
field in both political science and sociology that deserves further exploration. Several 
researchers have Iinke~ soccer to political unrest, but not to democratization movements. 
In Soccer Versus the Enemy, Simon Kuper argues that the institutions of soccer 
(including clubs, sports ministries, supporter's groups) can both influence political unrest 
in authoritarian countries and keep dictators in power. Taking examples from Ukraine's 
Shakhtar Donetsk in the 1950s and the Argentinean World Cup in 1978, Kuper contep.ds 
that historically, governments use soccer as a political tool to sway public opinion and 
pressure opponents of the state. In Hooligan Wars, international researchers analyze 
sport's sociological impact on supporters, the media, and clubs. A key tenet from 
Hooligan Wars purports that individuals join supporter groups in their search for personal 
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identity. The community and civil society of supporter groups attract people who anchor 
themselves in the team's neighborhood. While these sources frame a political-
sociological basis for soccer, academic research has not investigated cases relating soccer 
to democratization. There is a missing link in the literature that connects 'soccer and civil 
society' to 'civil society and democratization'. 
In this paper, I will argue that soccer supP-orter groups can strengthen civil 
society, which contributes to the success of democratization movements. Before 
democratization, non-democratic administrations freely exercise their political power to 
oppress opposition groups that 'threaten' the state. Many times, these opposition groups 
represent suppressed minority communities that rely on civil society to maintain their 
social identity. In response, civil society groups, such as Ultras,· engage in social 
movements, promoting equal political rights and fair, free elections. As significant actors 
in civil society, soccer firms use coordinating, networking, and street-fighting skills-in 
specific democratization cases. This paper is comprised of five chapters. First, I will 
explain and analyze democracy, democratization theories, and civil society's role in 
social movements. Second, I will argue that soccer plays a critical role in civil society 
and the teaching of democratic ideals. 
In chapters 3 and 4, I will apply democratization theories to civil society in two 
case studies: Egypt and Turkey. Although Egypt and Turkey experienced revolutions 
with vastly different scales, dissimilar initial government structures, and contrasting 
causes, both states present comparable preconditions that justify their shared analysis, as 
explained in my methodology. Both Egypt and Turkey are similarly populated, 
historically significant, strategically located nations that house the Middle East's/East 
Mediterranean's top soccer clubs and passionate supporters. Both states host secularist-
Islamist party tensions and the history of military involvement in governance. Recent 
popular uprisings expressed similar demands for more expansive freedoms for minority 
parties, the end of government corruption, and greater accountability within the executive 
branch. The chapters do not argue that Egypt's 2011 revolution compares to Turkey's 
Gezi Park Riots. The chapters claim that variations of soccer's presence in civil society 
played significant roles in the respective movements. After thirty years of Hosni 
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Mubarak's authoritarian rule, Egypt's infant civil society and soccer groups initiated the 
state's democratization, but suffered from military intervention and internal difference 
within opposition groups. In Turkey's established semi-democratic system (disassociated 
from the military), Gezi Park protestors and supporter groups created a movement that 
demanded a democratized form ofKemalism. In chapter 5, I will contrast the two cases, 
which both stru:ted with comparable beginnings, but ended with different outcomes, 
notably the demise of Egypt's Hosni Mubarak and the persistence of Turkey's Recep 
Tayyip Erdogan. 
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Methodology 
The inspiration for this paper came from my semester-long study in Istanbul, Turkey, 
where I researched the history of Turkish democratization and soccer's impact on Turkish 
society. Based on my background knowledge of soccer and society (including print from 
authors like Dorsey, King, Kuhn, Kuper, and Murphy), I wanted to write about how 
soccer supporter groups have real political impacts as societal phenomena. From my 
previous studies on the Arab Spring and Middle Eastern security concerns, I embarked on 
a comparative analysis of Turkish and Egyptian social movements on democratization. I 
decided to compare Egypt and Turkey because both states experienced social upheaval 
for the similar reasons of government accountability, more equitable political 
participation, the decentralization of executive authority over legislative and judicial 
branches, concerns over Islamist power, general frustration with economic stagnation, 
and more. Both countries have populations of over 80 million people, a history of 
strategic importance for the Ottoman Empire and the West, and a passionate soccer 
support base. When formulating conclusions, I do not equate Egyptian and Turkish 
demonstrations to each other. I isolate the related variables in both cases and draw 
inferences from my application of these variables to established conjectures in political 
science and sociology. 
In my comparative study of Egypt and Turkey, I employ theories on civil 
society's impact on democratization movements to the soccer narrative of these cases. I 
use John Stuart Mill's Joint Method of Agreement and Difference to argue that soccer 
contributes to the country's varying democratization movements. This method stipulates 
that: 
If two or more instances in which the phenomenon occurs have only one 
circumstance in common, while two or more instances in which it does not occur 
have nothing in common save the absence of that circumstance; the circumstance 
in which alone the two sets of instances differ, is the effect, or cause, or a 
necessary part of the cause, of the phenomenon (Mill, p. 463). 
This method of comparative analysis means that in cases where A B C occur with x y z, 
AD E occur with x v w also B C occur withy z. Comparing this 'ABC' scenario to my 
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research, I argue that the involvement of soccer supporter groups in social issues (x) and 
several other factors relevant to the case study (y z or v w) contributes to democratization 
movements (A). Other outcomes (B CorD E) occur because of the difference in the 
nature of each democratization movement. Examples of these different outcomes include 
Egypt's extended military control of the interim government or Ttirkey's external 
investigations in state actions. Soccer firms' contribution to civil society remains as the 
constant variable in the thesis' comparative study of Egypt and Turkey. 
Based upon prior knowledge of soccer's relationship with the movements, my 
research began with examining each country's kind of soccer supporter group and their 
influence within their neighborhoods. I investigated each firms' participation in the 
demonstrations and used this information to broaden my study of the politics behind the 
movements. Amidst this research, I connected soccer supporter groups to civil society 
associations with strong local identities. This mental connection coincided with my initial 
research on democracy and democratization theory. I turned to texts ofNewton, 
Bernhard, and others for theories on. civil society and democratization movements. When 
I started writing, I began with democracy theories, then soccer and civil society, then 
both cases, and fmally my conclusion and introduction. My editing process consisted of 
many peer and professional edits, rereadings, the bolstering of introduction, theory and 
conclusion sections, the attachment of a glossary, and more references. In the next 
section, I review democracy, democratization, and civil society theories in order to frame 
my cases and conclusions. 
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1. Framing Democracy, Democratization and Civil Society 
In the past century, democracy has been the most salient and globalized of political 
systems. People's pairing.of democracy with greater hum~ rights and peace makes it 
appear as a vessel for human progress. Under autocracies and dictatorships, citizens have 
expressed the need for greater individual autonomy and accountability from the state. 
Samuel Huntington's "third wave of-democratization" acknowledges the increase of 'full 
democracies' from 44 states in 1985 to 93 states in 2005 (Haerpfer et al., p.2). Each 
state's motivation for democratization varies, depending on the kind of governance of 
each previous regime. The democratization process of an autocracy to a hybrid regime 
has a different logic than the transition of a hybrid regime to a constitutional democracy. 
In essence, it is difficult to make basic comparisons in different types of democratization. 
Nonetheless, one can compare democratic theories in each case and analyze the relevance 
of each theory. In particular, the power of civil society and mass mobilizations plays a 
crucial role in democratization. Social capital and the skills taught by a political 
community mirror democracy's fundamental principles. Inclusive social groups establish· 
unifying norms and values to directly influence the public's perception of appropriate 
governance. In this section, I will outline the fundamentals of democracy, 
democratization, and three modem sources of democratization. From these three 
connections, strong civil society plays an essential role in the democratization of 
authoritarian and semi-authoritarian regimes. 
The Framework of Democracy 
Democracy's far-reaching appeal originates in its assumed support for populist and, 
quintessentially, 'human' action in government. Citizens enter into a nonconsensual 
social contract, where they trade their allegiance to the rule of law for the state's 
protection and representation of their needs. In this social contract, citizens hold the state 
accountable for its actions based on fair and competitive elections and the state's respect 
for citizenship (Hobbes, Locke). 
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Democracies require the freedom of a fair election. Fair elections necessitate 
equal accessibility to the polls, government non-interference in the process, and a choice 
of different parties in the competition for power. Openness to polling locations and other 
electoral institutions necessitate fair competitive elections. Freedom of association, 
expression, and press allow citizens to engage in an election unbound from state 
intervention. Political particip~tion holds the government accountable by safeguarding 
the freedom of thought, political parties, and independent media. 
Democratic regimes protect the sanctity of a person's citizenship or political 
rights as loyal member of the country. Guillermo O'Donnell writes, "the guiding 
principle for democracy is citizenship, which is the right to be treated as equal when 
making collective choices and the [government's] obligation to implement such choices 
to be equally accountable and accessible to all members of the polity" (O'Donnell, p.7). 
Perfect democracies respect these political rights, including the conversion of the winning 
number of votes into the appointment of an elected official, party, or bill. Also, 
citizenship is the equal accessibility to political opportunities and equal judgment under 
law. The state provides accessible election ballots, space for multiple parties, and a fair 
and equal hearing in court. Universal suffrage means equal political participation among 
all social groups in the country. The votes cast by adult citizens must delegate political 
power to the individual/party chosen. Democracy exists for citizens to "hold rulers 
accountable for their actions in the public realm through the competition and cooperation 
of elected representatives" (Whitehead, p.l 0). Through equal opportunity in politics, fair 
lawful judgment, and the translation ofvotes, democratic states safeguard citizenship. 
There is a spectrum of the various levels of democracy. The degree of a state's 
commitment to democracy's principles designates its place on the spectrum from a 
'perfect constitutional democracies' to hybrid regimes to extreme 'totalitarian regimes'. 
States are categorized into different systems of governance based on their dedication to 
fair elections and citizenship. A constitutional democracy prescribes to the belief that the 
actions of regimes are constrained by both the mass electorate and the rule oflaw. Courts 
can void the actions of governors inconsistent with the law. In a plebicitarian autocracy 
or "delegative democracies" (O'Donnell), the state conducts elections with mass 
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participation and competition between parties and candidates. But, the elections are not 
free or fair because the judiciary does not regulate the actions of elected officials. Weak 
institutional checks and balances allow the executive branch to use power to encroach on 
legislative and judicial institutions. With the manipulation of laws, a plebiscitarian 
autocracy could forgo fair elections indefmitely. An unaccountable autocracy does not 
conduct elections and can override the constitution with judges acting subservient to 
governors. Although the use of power becomes arbitrary for autocrats, social life is not a 
concern of the state. In totalitarian regimes, the state "systematically and pervasively 
[seeks] to control the whole of its subject's lives" (Haerpfer et al., p.16). The different 
types of regimes establish distinct settings and outcomes of democratization movements. 
Democratization Theories 
The instigators of democratization movements pursue greater political participation by 
the populace and more accountability held by the government. As a "long-term process of 
social construction" (Whitehead, p.6), democratization introduces democratic criteria to 
hybrid democracies or non-democratic systems. Successful democratization brings about 
five criteria: effective participation, voting equality, enlightened understanding, control of 
the agenda, and inclusion (Dahl). Without a citizen's ability to participate effectively in 
politics, elections would not be fair or free, thus violating a fundamental democratic 
principle. Universal suffrage grants equality and citizenship to all members of the 
democratic society. Enlightened understanding is interpreted as a citizen's freedom of 
knowledge and accessibility to that knowledge from media sources (i.e. freedom of 
expression). The impact of a vote must translate to some indirect control of the 
government's agenda in power. Finally, the inclusion of all societal members in the 
democratic process means equal citizenship on a statewide scale. 
Democratization instigators may take action through mass demonstrations, 
military coup d'etats, inner government shifts, peaceful moves towards a constitution, or 
a foreign state's intervention to restructure an undemocratic regime. O'Donnell classifies 
a democratic transition as "the processes whereby the rules and procedures of citizenship 
are either applied to political institutions previously governed by other principles ... or 
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expanded-to include persons not previously enjoying such rights and obligations ... or 
extended to cover issues and institutions not previous subject to citizen participation" 
(O'Donnell, p.8). Democratization rarely happens overnight. The movements have false 
starts, misjudgments, unintended consequences, and detours; thetransitions involve many 
different interests and goals. Furthermore, the end of a democratization movement is 
generally not clear, stable, or predetermined. 
Democratization can start at any point on the spectrum of political structures, 
whether the previous structure was democratic or undemocratic. The transition can 
happen from within the.state structure or from popular mass action. When the democratic 
transition is not forced by external actors but occurs from the citizens' demands for 
federal accountability, theorists classify this process as 'responsive democratization'. 
Given that the country itself chose to become more democratic, this kind of 
democratization embeds democracy in the society and reinforces the governance's 
stability. 
In the 'third wave of democratization', political scientists have identified three 
key influences in triggering transitions: modernization, economic prosperity, and strong 
civil society. Modernization involves many different processes such as urbanization, 
social diversification, wider technological access, higher education levels, openness of 
information, and communication within and outside the country, among others. But, 
which of these examples particularly favors democratization? Christian Welzel argues, 
"they enhance the resources available to ordinary people, and this increases the masses' 
capabilities to launch and sustairi collective actions for common demands, mounting 
effective pressures on state authorities to respond" (Haerpfer, p.81 ). In essence, 
modernization improves the masses' political influence. Across new democracies in the 
Soviet bloc, economic prosperity has risen following the Soviet Union's demise and 
capitalism's control of the market economy. Historically, people have often linked the 
trends of capitalism and democracy. They embody similar doctrines of individual 
freedom and accountability of government/leadership. Democracy encourages 
privatization of businesses and resources and capitalist firms want some freedom in 
making mark~t-decisions. However, capitalism can undermine the quality of democracy 
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by creating wealth inequalities, manipulating public' opinion, and commodifying people's 
personal information (like data collection). Strong civil society brings together different 
kinds of people to interact and respect other·ideas. Civil society encourages participation 
and citizenship, two core democratic principles. Laurence Whitehead points· out that, "the 
obvious question ... in new democracies is how associative and communicative practices 
of civil society are to be squared with the aspirational or juridical fictions of 'political 
society"' (p.78). In the next section, I will focus on strong civil society as a significant 
influence in democratization. 
Civil Society in Democratization · 
Among the necessary facilitating powers behind democratization, civil society and 
voluntary associations serve as a state-monitoring device that helps the common citizen 
interpret their government's actions. Through the mechanism ofcivil society, groups of 
citizens meet, discuss, and relate politically. This vessel for community interaction 
establishes "the sphere of autonomy from which political forces representing 
constellations of interests in a society have contested state power" (Bernhard, p.307). 
Since independent groups provide a space for political participation and action, strong 
civil society is a necessity for democratization. The presence of voluntary associatfons 
aids democratization in three-ways. First, civil society emphasizes democratic principles 
such as social capital and citizen participation. Second, civic groups occupy political 
. space that reinforces the stability of democratization.- Third, the networks and outj,uts of a 
political community inspire agency in mass mobilizations and social movements. Civil 
society pressures regimes to be more democratic and responsive to society's needs. 
First, by engaging citizens in political discourse in their community, civil society 
promotes the unifying force of social capital; which directly contributes to 
democratization. Through frequent meetings and events, a vertical voluntary association 
(like a church group or the Lion's Club) initiates dialogue between people with different· 
interests and perspectives. When members of civil society understand and listen: to 
alternative perspectives, they often develop trust and empathy for their fellow members. 
Social capital consists of subjective values and attitudes that bind citizens together 
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through a mutual understanding of difference. Trust and reciprocity are imperative for 
sociaVpolitical cohesion, stability, and cooperation. Generalized reciprocity requires risk-
taking and vulnerability, where one person's good service will berepaid at an-uncertain 
future time, by an unknown stranger. Organizations espouse the messages of trust that 
mirror democratic values. Civic virtues of moderation, compromise, and balanced 
discussion teach members how to partiCipate.in a political structure that oscillates 
between priorities on social values. A trust or faith in the system of a community group 
runs parallel to the understanding of partisanship in a democracy. Without the 
consolidation of trust, democratization: movements prioritize governance that favors 
individual's interests rather than equal participation. Critics of civil society's role in 
democratization believe that a small assembly's interests control a larger group's 
demands for a change in governance; through vertical power structures, an organization's 
leaders dictate the norms of civil society (O'Donnell). In particular cases (like the US 
Democratic or Republican party), these statements hold validity. Yet, in locally 
influenced community settings, voluntary associations have horizontal linkages that allow 
equal participation and the socialization of citizenship (Newton,. p.229). Based off the 
Tocquevillian model ofcivic virtue, socially integrated groups produce. 'thin trust', an 
outcome of non-personal ties that constitute an enduring basis for community integration 
in large-scale society. By creating trust and social capital between different citizens, civil 
society teaches the skills of compromise that reinforce democracy's principles of. 
participation and citizenship. 
Second, through the occupation of space, citizens exercise the freedom of 
assembly, expression and association with their participation in civil society. A voluntary 
association acts upon these democratic freedoms when it inhabits space. Spatial 
occupation displays thetangible existence of the norms and values that circulate society. · 
During meetings, protests, events, or even imprisonments, an organization turns 
"constrained physical landscapes [like buildings or squares] into venues for people 
power" (Cruz-Del Rosario, p.2) By dissenting from the· undemocratic values of a pre-
transition regime, civil society exercises rights to expression through information 
dissemination. Groups use physical space as a podium for broadcasting knowledge and 
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the issues facing the community; they turri space ·into ·a strategic resource. Additionally, 
organizations hold onto public space independent from the exercise of state power, which 
gives them the ability to freely judge the nature of the regime. Democratization requires 
the physical manifestation of the opposition's demands and the capabilities for political 
organization. During initial uprisings, undemocratic governments want control of all 
political space, in order to root out the materialization of democratic principles. 
O'Donnell writes: 
By trivializing citizenship and repressing political identities, authoritarian rule . 
destroys self-organized and autonomously defined political spaces and substitutes 
them for a state-controlled arena in which anydiscussion of issues must be made 
in codes and terms established by the rulers (p. 48). 
' . . 
In a transitional period, civil society :and the ruling collective place high value on spatial · · 
power and symbolism, because civil society applies the freedom of expression and . 
association to the manifestation of the democratizing goals. 
Third, civil society socializes individuals into cooperative behavior and provides 
them with the skills to shape politics at a local and national level. Each voluntary 
association has a particular mission with norms and values that correlate with the group's 
aims. Civil society's physical promotion ofdemocracy building unites members in the 
cause for equal rights and control. The development of social capital and presence of an 
organization grows the networks of civil society.· Through networks of newsletters, _ : 
websites, face-to-face interactions, and social media, groups expand and enhance· their 
community beyond a dedicated few. Networks "permitted long-term and long-distance 
coordination of the activities of many people who had never met ... to experience 
themselves ·as members of a community-a movement--engaged in a connilon purpose" 
(Markoff, p.25). Networks link people to give them agency· in democratization. · 
Organizations with denser networks:reinforce impersonal trust, which brings citizens to · . 
work together. While the norms of civil society emulate political participation, "we learn 
to participate by participating" (Pateman, p.l 05). A popular upsurge plays the essential 
role of pushing the transition furtherithan it might otherwise have gone. The deprivation 
of citizenship inspires voluntary associations to act in ways that mirror their beliefs in 
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dialogue and inclusion. "Fraternity (or social capital) tum a self-defeating concern with . 
individual liberty into a sustainable concern for collective liberty and social justice" 
(Newton, p.226). The networks and.collective action of civil society inspires members to 
consolidate as a functional unit for democratization and state accountability. 
The success of democratization is embedded in the strength of a society's civic 
engagement collectives. Not only does civil society instruct citizens on the democratic 
principles of participation and compromise, organizations occupy public space to espouse 
a message, with the emphasis placed on their freedom of expression and association. The 
involvement of civil society in transitional periods provides networks, skills, and 
organizing factors that expedite the process. Civil society does not always include 
everyone. But horizontally structured groups, which root themselves in a community 
mission, facilitate the construction of democracy. 
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2. Soccer Supporters as Civil Society 
Throughout the world, sports teams ·act as the ambassadors of Cities, communities, or 
countries. Citizens identify with their team as the embodiment of their local pride and 
traditions. Even when the players hail from different loCations, sp'orts clubs possess a 
strong local tie to the geographic and social landscape of its origins. The roots of a soccer 
team include the community's history, politics, economics, and culture. With the 
increasing integration of world markets and information, many soccer communities have 
grown beyond the boundaries of a neighborhood or a state's borders; the corpotatization 
of soccer has erased certain traditional practices and styles of play for a club. 
Nevertheless, a soccer club remains tied to a local identity that can unify people from 
across the globe. Within the clubs, supporter groups express a club's identity and their 
loyalty through marches, banners, and organized events. Also known as firms or Ultras, 
some supporter groups in the Mediterranean have open membership, equal power 
distribution, and community outreach. These firms become an integral part of civil 
society, where they engage in democratic discussions, occupy a political space, and 
participate in political action. In this section, I will outline how soccer creates solidarity 
that reaches beyond its neighborhood's boundaries. Moreover, lwill argue that supporter 
groups, as a part of civil society, teach and influence democratization processes. 
Soccer and Identity 
Through cultural markers, geopolitics, and a club's socioeconomic background, a soccer 
club's supporters act as a unit in their representation of their local community's culture 
and politics. Unlike most other sports, soccer clubs establish themselves as a cultural 
center within urban neighborhoods. Fans interweave their club's history into the social 
fabric of their community. A supporter group will buttress their community's space with 
cultural markers, including colors, statues, and symbols. Surrounding their stadium, 
restaurants, pubs, community centers and other neighborhood spaces post banners of a 
team's colors, their club's symbol, or even erect statues of icons in the open air. Team 
territorial markers usually originate in a cultural/political/economic institution that 
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distinguishes the neighborhood apart from others. In the case of West Ham United, their 
colors of claret and blue derived from the Thames Ironworks house colors, an East 
London shipyard where the future West Ham United began. In the center ofKadikoy, a 
neighborhood on the Asian side of Istanbul, Turkey, · the statue a charging bull, called 
Boga Heykeli, was given to Enver Pasha.in 1917 during the German Occupation. 
Supporters ofFenerbahce, the soccer team based in Kadikoy, reclaimed the statue and 
named it after Serhat Akin, a swift winger known for his bullish playing style. Using 
overt indicators of their club's territory, a community reinforces the presence of a soccer 
team in their area's physical space. 
Additionally, supporters mark their club's space through non-physical means, 
including songs, chants, and legends.The songs and chants act as supporter's anthems, 
which unify viewers with a social history. While many chants insult opposing teams or 
venerate their players, particular melodies hold their place in the community's identity. 
Originally based on a Rodgers and Hammerstein tune, 'You'll Never Walk Alone' 
echoes across Liverpool FC's grounds before every game. Yet, each April 15th, 
Liverpudlians remember the 1989 Hillsborough Disaster, where 96 fans died in a stadium 
catastrophe and controversy still circulates over police accusations and the retribution of 
the deceased. The Broadway melody 'You Never Walk Alone' represents supporter's 
solidarity and commiseration that drastically shaped their community and, more broadly, 
soccer stadium regulations. 
In accordance with the cultural markers of a soccer club's followers,the 
socioeconomic and political background of supporters can form the identity of a club and 
establish political rivalries between urban neighborhoods. Even: though widespread 
broadcasting and global fmancial integration of soccer clubs has commodified the 
identity of clubs and supporters (as discussed in the next paragraph), non-:European fringe 
leagues still retain strong connections between teams and the geopolitics of the 
neighborhood they are based in. For example, in Istanbul, there are three primary teams 
that boast the strongest support in the 15 million..,person city: Galatasaray (in the Galata 
neighborhood), Fenerbahce (in Kadikoy), and Besiktas (in Besiktas). Generally, 
supporters pledge loyalty to the team from the nearest neighborhood or based on their . 
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familial ties to a club. The geographic and social landscape of these communities reflects 
the identity and supporter's self-identification. 
Galata, a sub-neighborhood of Beyoglu, is located in the epicenter of Istanbul 
commerce and political institutions. Surrounded by foreign consulates, theaters, and some 
of Turkey's most luxurious restaurants, this neighborhood encompasses Istanbul's 
entertainment and·commercial nucleus. As Turkey's oldest and arguably most prestigious 
high school, Galatasaray Lisesi prepares Turkey's future leaders and has long been the 
bastion of Turkish aristocracy. This school founded Galatasaray Spor Kulubu (GS), 
where the school's political and economic preeminence carried over into soccer 
dominance with 46 domestic titles and a UEF A Cup title. As a club, Galatasaray has been 
associated as Istanbul's 'old wealth' club, where influential individuals influence the 
administrative decisions of GS. Club chairman Unal Aysal stated, "Galatasaray is 
property rich. We have places across Istanbul, we have 25 million fans around the world" 
(Hughes). 
Across the Bosphorus Strait on Istanbul's Asian side (Anadolu), Fenerbahce's 
success as Turkey's wealthiest soccer club mirrors the economic rise of Anadolu 
businesses. Less than a century ago, Kadikoy embodied traditional Ottoman values and 
poor economic growth. Without the two bridges that connected the sides in 1973, the lack 
of efficient cross-continental integration left neighborhoods like Kadikoy and Uskudar 
from Istanbul's rise to regional power. In these respects, Turks recognized Fenerbahce as 
the team oflstanbul's working class. During the 1970s, Istanbul's rapid urbanization and 
booming construction industry changed the landscape of the Asian side. The bridging of 
both continents·opened inexpensive property opportunities for industrial development in 
Anadolu. Kadikoy's growing wealth index gentrified the neighborhood and Fenerbahce 
as a club. Parallel to the influx of capital into the area, Fenerbahce won four league titles 
and made itself as powerhouse. Today, Fenerbahce stands as Turkey's richest team with 
annual revenues of$142.7 million ("World's Richest Soccer clubs"). 
Besiktas, Turkey's third largest club, sits in one oflstanbul's transportation, 
commercial, and population-dense communities. In the pedestrian market place, 
apartments overlook the maze-like streets that snake between hidden hookah bars and 
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subterranean barbershops. Located in a central neighborhood on the European side, 
Besiktas square has spatial significance for upset citizens voicing their opinion. Since 
Taksim Square in Beyoglu is characterized as the battleground between people and the 
government during demonstrations, police anticipate protestors marching to Taksim and, 
in recent years, have closed off access to Istanbul's center (Sozen, 2013 ). The police erect 
barriers in Besiktas Square in order .to prevent Taksim from being occupied as political 
space. As a transportation hub with thousands of commuters daily, Besiktas became an 
important space for gathering demonstrators and voicing political frustration. With 
industrial architecture and condensed urban living, Besiktas .identifies as an area 
controlled and unified by the people and community values .. Evenwith a police 
headquarters nearby, the constant flow of workers, families, and businessmen attracts a 
degree of anonymity from the police. In soccer, Besiktas Jimnastik Kulubu (BJK) is 
IstanbuPs oldest club and the less wealthy of the other two teams. 1 In comparison to 
Galatasaray and Fenerbahce, residents classify BJK·as the team of the proletariat, even 
though these claims are not necessarily true. 
With soccer's accessibility to infiltrate foreign markets through TV broadcasting 
and the greater mobility of people through urban landscapes, the corporatization of clubs 
dilutes a team's social and political identity. Since the 1980s, distinctions between 
neighborhood teams have deteriorated until few clubs in major leagues retain their local 
ties. Since a club's own~rs and upper administrators do not reflect the demands of the 
fans and since a club's squad hails from different continents, a soccer club no .longer 
represents the club's supporters. In the Istanbul cases, the cultural identities still exist in 
the cores of each neighborhood, but socioeconomic backgrounds do not separate fans 
based on teams. The geopolitical distinctions between the clubs live on in the public's 
psyche, but the commercialization of each club and Istanbul's urbanization trends dismiss 
this myth. Furthermore, a club's socioeconomic background does not accurately 
characterize their supporter's identity. Erden Kosova, an Istanbul art critic, explains, 
1 This statement is in comparison to the other two main Istanbul teams. Istanbul B.B. was 
founded in 1990, and is less prosperous than the other three clubs. Also, there are sixteen 
lower division teams that are from Istanbul. In comparison, there are forty soccer clubs in 
London, England. · · 
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"Besiktas, Fenerbahce, and Galatasaray share more oi less the same sociology ... Surveys 
show, for example, that Besiktas supporters have stronger economic backgrounds than 
both Fenerbahce and Galatasaray" (Kuhn, p.171 ). Cities' growing infrastructure and 
educational support causes greater job mobility and movement in habitation. A more 
equal social distribution between Galata, Kadikoy, and Besiktas means that the clubs 
project a less politically charged image. Especially in the Premier League and La Liga, a 
club no longer fully represents a neighborhood with local players, owners, or even 
facilities. On October 2nd 2013, Manchester City fielded the first ever Premier League-
team without an English player and they won 7-0 over Norwich City .. Moreover, -
Manchester City lists- their supporter's chants on their websites (with explanations of all 
cultural references) so that fans abroad can join the club's fan network. Although owners 
have always recognized their sports team as a business enterprise, economic decisions 
guide the endeavors of club administrators in modem soccer cases. When Malaysian 
billionaire Vincent Tan took ownership of Cardiff City, he rebranded the club for 
marketing purposes by changing Cardiff's colors (from blue to red) and their emblem 
(from the bluebird to the dragon). The backlash from Cardiff supporters continues two 
years later, as fans continue to wear blue jerseys 'and lament their club's profit-
maximizing mindset (Manfred). As detailed in thenext section, supporter groups better 
represent a community's political aspirations rather than the clubs they support. 
In the fringe leagues of Egypt and Turkey, soccer is still tied to a cmillnunity's 
cultural identity, but the club's administration and players react to soccer's increasing 
integration to the global political economy. The commodification of a club's crest 
converts a neighborhood insignia into the club's owners' brand. Ever more, a club will 
make a transformative decision independent from the community and supporter's 
consent. However, while the clubs attempt to exploit the romanticism behind cultural 
rivalries, soccer still unites neighborhoods under the umbrella of a team's history and 
attachment to the area. Supporter groups have replaced clubs as the main unifying 
political agents of a community. The soccer networks between friends, family, and 
community members are stronger than the connection between a fan and his/her. club. 
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Soccer and Civil Society 
With distin~t cultural/historical ties to their community, supporter'sgroups act as 
political units within civil society. Commonly known as firms or Ultras, these supporter 
groups are highly organized factions that dedicate themselves to their clubs and their 
fellow supporter. Unlike 'hooligan' firms, Ultras focus on the betterment of their 
team/community, rather than the fig~ting of another club's supporter's group. Supporter 
groups are linked through their allegiance to their club, family connections, political 
leanings, and ultimately, their role within their urban neighborhood. By displaying flags, 
flares, banners, and symbols, Ultrasemploy a club's cultural markers to demarcate 
territory and to intimidate opponents. Defmed as spectator groups with varying violent 
proclivities, Ultras collectively recognize that ''the unifying goal. .. is to offer strong 
expression and colorful support for their club" (Perryman, p.142). Occasionally, there is 
more than one firm per club; a club can have multiple firms generally differentiated 
political leanings. Firms occupy public space through community centers, pubs, city 
squares, streets, and stadia, In this section, supporter groups are identified as civil society 
in four ways. First, average fans join supporter groups in order to reaffirm their place in 
society and develop their own identity. Second, Ultras give agency to public areas, 
turning them into political areas. Third, Ultras organize themselves through formal 
institutional structures. Fourth, these supporter groups teach democratic principles that 
enable democratization movements. With these four aspects, supporter groups establish 
themselves as key political actors in civil society. 
First, the reasons for joining civil society groups are both the interest in the group 
and the development _of self-identity. In a community that draws its cultural values and 
history from a specific credence (whether it be religion, political party, or soccer), an 
individual has a natural interest in the unifying bond between themselves and the 
community. While an individual will have an awareness and interest on a socially 
embedded topic, this enthusiasm does riot translate to joining a civil society group. 
Becoming a member ofc:rcommunity group originates in an individual's need to attach 
one's identity, including values, passions~ and outlooks, to something bigger. Dorothy 
Rowe writes: 
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We need other people to confirm our theories, to assure us that we are valuable 
and lovable, that our life will unfold as we expect it to unfold, and that the world 
is what we see it. To get such confirmation, we join and identify with these 
groups whom we expect will provide that confirmation (p. 56). 
Joining an Ultra organization gives self-awareness and reaffirms significance to an 
individual's place in society. It helps develop status, reputation, and the search for 
inclusion and differentiation. Membership in a firm establishes an individual as a key role 
within the operation of bonding a community through soccer. Supporters project their 
collective love onto the community and their team. "We are drawn to people who share 
our views, and so all those who share a particular team as their patron saint come together 
as a group with shared attributes, rituals, and songs" (Perryman, p.57). 
Second, soccer firms give agency to public areas. Supporter groups transform 
streets, bars, transportation, and the stadium into a strategic resource for civil society. 
Before matches, Ultras, who have spent all week preparing spectacles, congregate in the 
centers ofneighborhoodsto converse, sing, eat dinner, and inevitably drink. As the 
squares and restaurants begin to overflow, supporters chant and march towards the soccer 
community's nucleus: the stadium. A team's arena is the-epicenter of territorial integrity· 
I'' 
that must be held from opposing supporters. Ultras believe that holding the stadium 
translates to their team's wins and the health of their neighborhood. They use· chants, 
flags, symbols, flares, and occasionally violence to maintain their possession of the 
ground from police presence. Simon Inglis describes the terraces of a stadium as, 
"nominally part of a private estate, [but] regarded by most of its users as a public space. 
You paid to enter, but once inside, you were part of a· free-form gathering. As long as 
consensus prevailed-in the form of self-policing and mutual respect-there was seldom 
any need for concern" (Perryman, p.92). Moreover, the stadium creates a unifying 
. . . 
anonymity for supporters to express their dreams and grievances with little to no 
governing control. Harry Sewell identifies this spatial agency as a conversion of 
"constrained physical landscapes into venues of people power" (Cruz-del Rosario, p.2). 
Stadiums set up a space for disenfranchised voices against authoritarian regimes. As 
explained in the Egyptian and Turkish cases, stadiums become a battleground between 
Ultras and the state for control over civil society. Supporter groups take space that are 
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entrenched facets of social life and employ occupational strategies to affirm the 
significance of people in society. Althoughsupporter groups are institutionalized, the 
seizure of space shows. people's dislodging of public establishments. 
Third, unlike the covert, unorganized violence of hooligan culture, a small group 
of leaders design Ultra groups to organize visual expression, marches, and political. 
agendas. Ultras have a formally institutional structure with headquarters, elections for 
leadership, membership lists, and a "rational-bureaucratic model of association" 
(Perryman, p.l42). Some organizations have hierarchal positions like president, treasurer, 
and secretary. However, many others, like Ultra White Knights (from Cairo'sAl-
Zamalek club) in Egypt, derive leadership from coordination committees and horizontal 
synchronization. In this vein, most firms do not have strict membership eligibility 
requirements. Even though the structures of firms have a core group of leaders, the 
groups remain opento anyone with a love for the club and team. As highly organized 
factions, firms perform weekly activities like program events, prepare for matches, 
organize trips, fundraise, and rally in political settings. The Egyptian club Al-Ahly's firm, 
called Ultra Ahlawy, designates members to execute an 'al.:.mission' each week, which 
varies each week. These duties reinforce the cohesion of supporters that pledge to Ultra 
Ahlawy. Equal participation and individualized missions distributes power horizontally 
among Ultra members. Additionally, Ultras use familial, social and online networks to 
connect different members of the community to each other. Increasingly in political 
protest, Ultras around the Middle;Eastuse Twitter and Facebook to coordinate the 
movement_s of protestors and announce issues about community security. These 
technologies construct ~ instantaneous virtual association between Ultra groups in 
different communities or countries. Digital social networks spread information among 
many members and gives individuals' agency. Firms' horizontal structures and networks 
will be outlined in the respective cases of Egyptian and Turkish soccer. 
Fourth, some supporter groups establish social capital, a respect for the election 
process, balanced political discussions, and citizen participation. Fan organizations center 
around the essential themes of club, equal inclusion, and just process. In specific urban 
areas, community members trust the horizontal organization of Ultras over underhanded 
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law enforcement (Batuman). A degree of unspoken altruism coimects supporters in 
urbanized communities. The Tocquevillian model of civic virtue translates to the social 
trust built between members of soccer's civil society. Coined by sociologist Emile 
Durkheim, 'organic solidarity' is the impersonal; yet altruistic connection that stems from 
trust and reciprocity. By constructing 'thin trusf, firms unite the weak ties of a 
heterogeneous neighborhood through the adhesive of sports' passion. The supporter's 
~ . 
social capital changes' an individual's worries ~ for self-expression and liberty into the 
"sustainable concern for collective liberty and social justice" (Newton, p.226). Soccer's 
concept of impersonal reciprocity serves as a civil society's contribution to ~ 
democratization. When an individual's good service might be repaid at an uncertain time, 
by an unknown stranger, reciprocity underpins political cohesion, cooperation, and other 
democratic ideals. "The existence of a civil society with a democratic state is a absolute 
necessity ... [a] solidarity movement [is] able to force the party-state regime to recognize 
the principle of autonomous organization and the boundaries of the public space" · 
(Bernhard, p.325). 
Historically, civil society increases voter turnout during election years because 
. . . 
organized groups increase political awareness through debate and a stronger bond to the 
greater good of their area. In an attempt to show how civil society plays in the elections · 
process, American Citizen Participation Study (1990) recorded that non-members of civil 
society scored 2.9/10 on a political knowledge test, while members of chtirches, veteran's 
groups, and sports groups scored 5.6/10. While Ultras may not believe in their political 
system, they acknowledge sociopolitical problems that impact their daily life and the -
livelihood of their soccer family. Through balanced networks of political debate, . 
supporter groups use disseminated knowledge to hold accountable politicians, their club's 
board, and even leaders of their Ultra group. The broader issues cif unemployment~ · 
poverty, corruption, or environmental concerns circulate group meetings, pub-talk, and·' 
stadium chants. In a case ofEgypt's·Al-Ahly, their Ultra firm Al-Ahlawy dismissed a 
founding leader of the firm because he spoke openly to the media about the organization. · 
In most Egyptian institutions duriD.g::the Mubarak era, an upper level coordinator would 
not be democratically dismissed for violating one institutional rule. yet in' the case of 
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firms, "participation in voluntary associations, consistent with a theory of social capital, 
seems to enhance the ability of some citizens to hold the executive accountability for 
policy outputs" (Claibourn and Martin, p.l99). The power held within citizen 
participation teaches democratic norms of election turnout and political accountability. 
As detailed in this section, soccer plays a pivotal role in determining community 
identity, civil society, and modes for democratic action. Displaying symbols, banners, 
colors, and territorial presence, soccer groups mark social and political difference 
between other firms and their club's corporatization of the sport. Moreover, Ultras act as 
political units through the sociological binding of a community, the occupation of public 
space, their internal structure, and their learned democratic values. In non-democratic 
regimes, these values create an early understanding for how equality operates before law. 
Firms' horizontal structures empower members when these individuals lack any political 
influence in local or national governance. In authoritarian regimes (Egypt) and 
plebiscitarian autocracies {Turkey), supporter groups provide the stepping-stone for the 
democratization movements. The following chapters will outline how soccer contested 
the non-democratic state power, created avenues of organized protests, and faced 
challenges in implementing their demands. The chapters will argue that as creators of 
'thin trust' and civic virtue, soccer groups pioneered the initial success of 
democratization in Egypt and Turkey. 
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3. The Rise of the Egyptian Ultra Movement: Revolutionary Soccer 
Without soccer, the Egyptian 2011 revolution would not have been successful. In the past 
decade, several uprisings against Mubarak have challenged the authoritarian regime, but 
they did not become popular movements. Before January 25th 2011, Egypt wilted under 
the weight of poverty, unequal income distribution, a flawed educational system, 
government and police corruption, unemployment, militarism, and many other 
political/economic factors. Egypt's vastly heterogeneous demographics demanded 
different needs from the stalwart administration; they could not· articulate their need for 
greater representation in governmen?. Whil~ secular liberals requested a Western-style 
democracy, Islamists called for a reinforcementoftheir lost identity's roots in Islamic· 
tradition; military officials inquired a new system to control Mubarak's legislation; 
anarchists called for freedom above all else. After thirty years ofHosni Mubarak's rule 
and of a- perpetual 'state of emergency', groups not affiliated with Mubarak felt 
disempowered without citizen participation, fair or free elections, adequate 
implementation of democratic policy, judiciary oversight, or human rights freedoms. The 
authorities disallowed non-religious forms o(expression, community organizing, or art. 
In 2007, the already soccer-mad country created their first supporter groups in 
Cairo. Separate from the preexisting, board-managed Football Associations {FAs), fans 
operated their supporter groups without the oversight of Mubarak-appointed club 
chairmen. As some of the freest parts of civil society, Ultras became increasingly 
organized and opposed to the restrictions by the police, Egyptian Football Association 
(EF A), club boards, the state, and the media. Initially as apolitical firms, Ultras from 
Cairo's rival clubs Al-Ahly and Al-Zamalek engaged young men in soccer, social 
discourse, civic service, and civil participation. 
2 Egypt's heterogeneous interests come from religious, and political divides between 
citizens. Among Egypt's various religious perspectives, 90% are Islamic (with a Sunni 
majority and Shiite minorities) and 9% are Coptic Christians. However, "Islam in Egypt 
is plural (if not always liberal) and diverse (if not necessarily heterogeneous) ... this 
homogenous Sunni population is diverse in its approach to politics" (Sullivan and Abed-
Kotob, p.19). Egypt's political pluralism includes Islamists, secularists, liberalists, 
Marxists, Mubarak followers, and military supporters (Springborg). 
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In early 20 11, Ultras became an essential part of the demonstrations that toppled 
Mubarak. They used the-tools of community engagement, organization of the masses, 
street fighting, and networking. They replaced fear with a collective courage. The nature 
of the demonstrations evolved and so did the identities ofUltras. Mirroring the passion of 
the young revolutionaries, Cairo's two Ultra firms Al-Ahlawy (from Al-Ahly) and Ultra 
White Knights (from Al-Zamalek) transitioned from apolitical attitudes to a .celebration 
of the revolution and collective action across rival lines. Even though many other factors 
attributed to the success ofMubarak's deposition3, Ultras' actions developed civil society 
and contributed significantly to Egypt's democratization: In the post ... uprising period of 
elections, Ultras struggled with direct political influence. 
Sinc·e civil society was in its infant stages under Mubarak's oppression, the young 
revolutionaries lacked the political knowledge or cloutto form a viable political party. 
Ultras faced further challenges in the police and military intimidation during the Port 
Said disaster in 2012. Skepticism for the state still exists and the deposition of Mohamed 
pressure Morsi unearths further criticism of the Egyptian military. While soccer 
supporters were essential for the awakening of Egypt's populace, they understandably 
could not fully democratize their nation overnight. Currently, Ultras continue to resurrect 
Egypt's civil society as the leading protestors of the justice, police, and governance 
systems. From January 25th to February 101h 2011, Egypt transitioned from an 
authoritarian rule to plebicitarian autocracy, but following the suspension of the 
legislative and judicial bodies, I argue that the Egyptian state still operates as an 
authoritarian government. 
In this chapter, I will map out the Ultras' role in the Egyptian uprisings and how 
slow democratization stemmed from the tools acquired by an infant civil societal 
structure. The chapter will be split into six sections. First, supporters created Cairo's 
apolitical Ultras as independent entities that represented the supporters' needs over the 
higher-powered board members. Second, with influences from Tunisia, Ultras imparted 
revolutionary individuals with necessary skills for protest, but did not actively endorse 
3 These other key factors to the revolution's success include the military's intervention in 
deposing Mubarak (Kirkpatrick), the protestors' use of social media (Juris p.260), 
demands by outside countries ("Pressure builds on Mubarak"), and many others. 
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the movement. Third, these firms adoptedthe spirit ofthe protests and changed the 
groups' essence from club-focused to democracy-building. Fourth, supporter groups used 
specific networks and soccer's unifying bonds to connect Egypt's heterogeneous 
population in a single task. Fifth, soccer's role in Egypt's developing civil society did not 
completely democratize Egypt; strong military intervention and wide-spread 
demographical needs halted the country's progressive democratization. Sixth, Ultras' 
power grows as grassroots campaigns for social justice, secularism, and peace. This 
uprising involved multidimensional political identities that contributed to the 'end' of the 
modem country's longest autocracy. Withoutnoting the role of Egypt's Ultras, outsiders 
fail to grasp the full picture of Egypt's young revolutionaries' motivations and 
quintessence. 
Egypt's Pre-Revolution Ultras 
Before supporter groups existed in 2007, Mubarak's state apparatus controlled soccer 
clubs and supporter organizations. Half of Egypt's Premier League clubs were affiliated 
to the military, police, government ministers or provincial authorities (Cruz-del Rosario). 
Military-owned construction companies built 22 Egyptian stadiums and former President 
Mubarak appointed loyalists in charge of the league: Samir Zaher as president of the 
EF A, Hassan Saqr as National Sports Council chairman, Hassan Shehata as national team 
coach, and Hassan Hamdi as chairman of Al-Ahly SC (arguably the most successful club 
team in the African continent). Supporters could join Fan Associations (FAs), but the 
clubs' board members managed the events, expression, and mission of the groups. In a 
broader sense, -Egyptians were restricted from joining opposition political parties, anti-
neoliberal movements, or even local art troupes. As a former associate to the Nasser 
regime, Mubarak introduced a 30-year 'state of emergency' that suspended individual 
rights for Egyptian security purposes. While he lifted Egypt out of immense debt and 
modernized the economy' the restraints on individual freedom and the growing income 
gap marginalized millions of Egyptians. 
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In response to the state's control of soccer, several passionate supporters of 
Cairo's teams, Al-Ahly and Al-Zamalek, formed distinctive rival Ultra groups in 20074; 
the most prominent of these firms were Al-Ahlawy for Al-Ahly and Ultras White Knights 
for Al-Zamalek. Egyptians founded these Ultra groups as a reaction to society's 
estrangement of soccer supporters and an unrepresentative political system (Elgohari, 
May 2013). For both clubs, free expression of their passion for soccer guided the mission 
of the firms. Ultras unfurled banners that covered a quarter of the stadium, organized 
deafening chants, and marched openly to the stadium as a perceived threatening force. 
While each club despised the other, Ultras identified the enemy as repressive authority, 
including the police,- EF A, their club's board, and the state. One militant Ultra stated, 
"there is no competition in politics, so _competition moved to the soccer pitch. We do 
what we have to do against the rules and regulations when we think they are wrong. You 
can't change things in Egypt talking about politics. We're not political, the government 
knows that and has to deal with us" (Cruz-del Rosario, p.12). Ultras advocated for 
equality and respect within their internal structure, but regularly faced armed police in 
violent street conflicts. Police officers used teargas, water cannons, sheer numbers, and 
force to their advantage; young supporters, while mostly beaten by the police, learned 
street fighting organization and techniques. 
From their abhorrence for authoritarian control, Ultras emphasized a horizontal 
internal structure that integrated all members into their organization. While the 
performances, events, and violent outbursts required coordination and a leading direction, 
Cairo's two main firms balanced different operating committees so that no true leader 
existed: all members decided the mission of the respective firms (Elgohari). For both 
Ultras White Knights. and Al-Ahlawy, open membership allowed any dedicated supporter 
to join, anybody could be nominated to administer group_ affairs, and nobody was forced 
to act against their will. Common among all supporter groups is seniority as a criterion 
for a position of authority. Al-Ahlawy organized members through face-to-face and 
4 In 2007, younger members left their F As because of their close ties to the club 
administration. Drawing from Tunisian Ultras (the first North African Ultra groups), 
Egyptian youth created supporter groups across the country in order to develop stronger 
supporter identities (Elgohari, June 2013). 
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social networks, and kept cohesion through the assignment of specific weekly duties, 
termed 'al-mission'. Ultras White Knights had a more centralized system, described as 
"circumpunct" (Elgohari, May2013, p.15): ifUltras White Knights was pictured as a big 
circle, the firm's influential coordination subgroups represented smaller circles that 
would move closer to the center of influence depending on their importance at the time. 
For example, if Ultras White Knights witnessed the need for greater community outreach, 
a subgroup that organized food drives or youth development would have more authority 
during that time. Both Al-Ahlawy and Ultras White Knights have designated protective 
subgroups that operate to defend members in altercations with the police or rival Ultras. 
During the Mubarak years, protection of the stadium became vital for the survival 
ofEgyptian firms. As the only public space of anonymity, the stadiuni was the only 
public area liberated from police oversight. "The soccer match offered the 
disenfranchised a voice in an environment of forced silence and official 
misrepresentation, challenged the political and social boundaries set by authoritarian 
regimes and thrived on goal posts enlarged by globalization" (Cruz-del Rosario, p.1-2). 
Since Al-Ahly and Al-Zamalek share the Cairo International Stadium, each Ultra group · 
claims an opposite curve/terrace behind the goal. Historically th~ most inexpensive 
seating area, the "curva" has significant value to Ultras as their home and sanctuary. Riot 
police have attempted to displace Ultras in the past from curvas, but the density of fervent 
supporters secured their territory. When police forces tried to stop a game in 2008, the 
police and Al-Ahlawy clashed in a violent battle for control of the area. From the stadium 
conflicts·to the streets, Cairo's Ultras operated as horizontally organized, anti-state, 
apolitical agents. They attracted supporters from different races, religions, classes, and 
yet connected them though soccer. Ultra groups did not recognize the power of this 
connection in Egypt's heterogeneous, disintegrated society until the 2011 revolution. 
Ultras in the Revolution's Buildup 
As public frustration mounted in the Arab World, tensions between Ultras and the police 
heightened with more arrests, tighter-security procedures, and further unrest. In April 
2010 at an Al-Ahly match, the state enforced 30 police checkpoints, hid security cameras, 
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and refused entry to certain supporters. During a match between Al-Zamalek and Al-
Masry in November 2010, police tortured an Ultras White Knights leader, Turek 
Masakin, and in solidarity, supporters from both teams wore black clothing. In 
December, the police detained 50 Ultras as a precautionary measure during a Cairo 
derby. Increasingly, the role ofUltras focused on the call for political order and justice. 
When Tunisia revolted against state repression on December 14th 2011 and deposed 
president Ben Ali, Egyptian youth explored their power to protest. In a match between 
Al-Ahly against Al-Makasa, Al-Ahlawy members raised the Tunisian flag in the terraces 
and chantedin support ofTunisia's revolution. However, Egyptian students, secular 
liberals, Islamists, and many other kinds of people guided the commencement of the 
revolution, not the soccer Ultras. In the .direct lead-up to January 25th 2011, both Al-
Ahlawy and Ultras White Knights issued. statements to their mernbers that their mission 
was to display support for their respective clubs, not protest politically. During this 
nascent uprisi.J;lg, tl)e fim:i.s distanced themselves from a political stance and gave power 
to the individual's actions. Groups asserted the absence of their political, ideological, 
economic, or religious orientation; it was the freedom of the individual to choose their 
ideal country. Al-Ahlawy's message stated "the individual members have the freedom to 
believe in whatever ideas they want" (Elgohari, May 2013, p.41). In a private message, 
Ultras White Knights affirmed, "this is what we are preparing for" (Pollock, p.80). 
Even though Ultras understood that this public awakening could transform spaces 
for expression, politics, and society, it initially conflicted with their mission as 
supporters, Ultra groups represented varied interests from a diverse fan base; they were 
not supposed to be unified in a political movement. Therefore, on.the first day protests, 
individuals marched against the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) without a 
distinctive collective body. Members of Ultras White Knights saw their opponent 
members of Al-Ahlawy marching and vice versa. Aggravated by electoral corruption, 
censorship, police brutality, unemployment, and economic disparities, both Ultras united 
in participation in the demonstrations. When approaching the front lines of protest, an Al-
Ahly fan and his Ultras White· Knights neighbor realized that, "when we saw the police 
violent reaction, we remembered what the police was doing with us on our way to the 
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stadium or even in the streets" (Elgohari, May 2013, p.43). Within the next few days, Al-
Ahlawy and Ultras White Knights, as whole firms, collaborated, shared resources and 
shifted their identity in support of the protests. 
Unity in Action 
Ultras did not start the movement, but quickly joined and organized the protests. After 
years of street fighting conflicts and!organizational coordination, Cairo's two firms joined 
forces to occupy the streets and drive out police presence. By January 25th; the 
plausibility of a successful transitional period sparked the Ultras' involvement in the 
uprisings. From their initial apoliticaL( almost anti-political) position, both firins saw the 
revolution.as an opportunity for deposing the authorities that they had always opposed. 
The regime, media, club boards, and EFA had paiiited·them as criminals (Amara). Al-
Ahlawy and Ultras White Knights changed their identity by celebrating the members as 
martyrs of the revolution. The civil participation and civic duty taught during Ultra 
meetings was manifested onto the streets: As one enormous mass, young revolutionaries, 
elderly workers, Ultras, and many other kinds of protestors, Egypt stormed the streets of 
Cairo, demanding the end of an authoritarian era. "[The Ultras] fought battles, they 
understood organization, they understood logistics and they understo-od fighting a street 
battle with the police ... and in this sense, they played a very key role in breaking the 
barrier of fear" (Pollock, p.80): 
For eighteen days, hundreds of thousands of Egyptians occupied Tahrir Square. 
With makeshift tents sprouting up over night as the fighting continued, the Ultras used 
their mobilization skills to keep order in the square. The fihns organized social services 
within the settlement, including trash collection; medic booths, and demarcation· of media 
members. Ultras mapped out the square and supplied consistent fiow of information on 
the violence. They patrolled the square's perimeter and controlled entry. The occupation 
of public space signified the physical disruption of Egyptian life that the regime had · 
started. The protests would not- end until the authorities met their demands; the 
revolutionaries gave agency to public space by holding Tahrir Square captive. In the 
violent confrontations between protestors and police, the Ultras used battle-like·· 
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coordination to dislodge the security forces' presence. "The ultras' battle order included 
designated rock hurlers, specialists in turning over and torching vehicles for defensive 
purposes, and a machine like quartermaster crew delivering projectiles like clockwork on 
cardboard platters" (Cruz-del Rosario et al., p.14). Pro-Mubarak supporters that 
infiltrated the square were captured and humanely imprisoned in the Sadat metro station. 
The organized occupation and militant defense eradicated the longstanding fear of many 
Egyptians. Muhamed Hassan, a leader of Ultras White Knights, declared, "When the 
police attacked, we encouraged people. We told them notto run or be afraid. We started 
firing flares. People took courage and joined us, they know that we understand injustice 
and liked the fact that we fight the devil" (Cruz-del Rosario et al., p.15). 
Protestors constructed unity through chants, songs, and graffiti that did not focus 
on club, ethnic, or religious difference, but on freedom and a new future. Since protestors 
needed order to hold onto the square, occupants workedto keep areas clean, help injured 
neighbors, and feed their fellow citizen; this unity in Tahrir taught the values of civil 
society to revolutionaries involved. This micro-society fabricated .thin trust between 
protestors and fostered the need for civic virtue. Other Ultra groups around Egypt joined 
the protests including Ultras Yell ow Dragons from Ismaily _in Islmailia and Ultras Green 
Eagles from Al-Masry in Port Said. During an Al-Ahly versus Kimah Asman match, both 
Ultras chanted anti-Mubarak messages and targeted Habib El-Adly, the Minister of the 
Interior. While soldiers stopped the game and attempted to evacuate the stadium, the 
united firms held the terraces and collectively rebelled. Over 74 people were injured. 
Egypt's non-existent civil society during the Mubarak era started to emerge with the 
occupation and Ultras' use of networks. 
Networking and Communication 
Across the globe, observers marveled at technology's impact on the organization and 
management of Egypt's revolution. Labeled Egypt's "Twitter Revolution", the uprisings 
used social media and interpersonal networks to spread key information (Gvosdev). With 
hundreds of thousands of protestors moving in different directions, the messages of 
revolutionaries needed to travel quickly and reach a broad audience. Ultras' combination 
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of online media, graffiti, and television coordinated a diverse mass of protestors. 
Sociologists identified Egyptians' conui:mnication as the logics of aggregation, which 
assembles people with different backgrounds into a physical space, by using nonphysical 
networks. Online networks were organizational tools to highlight the direction of protest 
movements and to map out the.occupation's landscape. Twitter and Facebook provided 
instant information for hotspot areas of violence and safe-havens for injured protestors. 
Ultras networked with other members to ensure the effective success of demonstrations. 
"The occupations were liminal spaces where participants put into practice the alternative 
values related to the direct democracy, self-organization, and egalitarianism they were 
fighting for" (Juris, p.268). Soccer's online networks furthered the creation of a. digital 
civil society. 
As a sociological tool, social media connected Egypt's ethnically, religiously, and 
politically heterogeneous population by giving power to its members. Al-Ahlawy and 
Ultras White Knights reached out to thousands of members by posting images, videos, 
and messages on their victories over the police. In the safety of their own homes, 
supporters engaged and shared the stories with other social circles. After thirty years of 
suppressed expression, Egyptian individuals could undermine the state by navigating the 
unregulated pathways of the Internet. Hassan Mostafa, a defensive midfielder that played 
forAl-Ahly in 2005 and Zamalek in,2009, stated, "Social media has created bridges, has 
created channels between individuals, between activists, between even ordinary men, to 
speak out, to know that there are other men who think like me" (Pollock, p. 78). The 
power to share, criticize, and post on one's profile fostered the revolution's strong virtual· 
community. These networks allowed the circulation and exchange of ideas that reinforced 
interaction, collaboration, and debate of complex ideas. Twitter, Facebook, blogs, and 
emaillist-servs produced a sense of co-presence, which elicited feelings of solidarity in 
the community. This connectedness manifested itself in the physical occupation of public 
space.- Ultras used the logic of aggregation to unify members and non-members from 
heterogeneous backgrounds to support the revolution. Social media gave Egyptians the 
opportunity to participate actively in a nation-building movement. The logic of 
aggregation "helped to facilitate and reinforce a widespread politics of aggregation that 
34 
conceived the occupations as both an effective protest tactic and a model of an , 
alternative, directly democratic world" (Juris, p.268). Although the government 
periodically_ shut down Internet and phone connections, protestors used 'Thuranga' 
satellite phones that could send videos to other countries, which were eventually 
uploaded to social media sites. 
Additionally, Ultras expressed its anti-authoritarian mission through graffiti and 
television channels. As a purposefully illegal form of communication, street art and 
graffiti detailed the histories of previous clashes with the police, giving the revolution a 
narrative. While it mostly involved anti-establishment words and symbols, graffiti 
demarcated Ultras territories,_safe havens in homes, and escape routes. "During and after, 
[the] revolution, graffiti was considered one ofthe most important communication tools 
between the revolutionaries and the rest of the people. The Ultras depended on this 
graffiti to communicate their mentality, beliefs, and causes" (Elgohari, May 2013, p.27). 
Moreover, Egyptian television was a contested area of communication during the 
revolution. Egypt has the largest number of state-owned TV channels in the Arab World 
and used these channels to divertattention away from the uprisings (Amara, p.50). With 
news networks not covering the demonstrations, Al-Ahly and Al-~am~lek's privately_ 
owned team channels opened discussions on the protests. As independent channels 
geared towards the supporters, these fan channels "are still among the few spaces where 
" . 
it is possible for journalists and sports analysts to disapprove of Arab government 
policies for youth and sports development and to engage in debates on accountability and 
citizenship" (Amara, p.69). The opening up of media allowed freer flows of information 
between protestors ~md observers. More instantaneous and mobile technologies created 
'communities of communication'. These networks broadcast the revolution to foreign 
media sources, transforming every demonstrator into an insider. Supporter group's use of 
networks established closer bonds and more effective coordination. 
Post-Mubarak Politics: Military Intervention 
"One of the key measures of progress in the process of democratization in any 
given country is the implementation of regular, properly scrutinized, free and 
transparent elections of government officials" 
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-(Sarquis, p.886) 
. . . . . 
After the military deposition ofMubarak, Egypt's full democratization movement failed 
. . 
because of military domination of politics (Blanche) and the absence of populist_political 
parties that represented Egypt's diverse interests. With vast sectarian, ethnic, and political 
differences, Egypt's ideal democracy needed a spectrum of grassroots parties that 
connected to Egypt's different communities. However, thi~ section argues that three areas 
of weakness diluted Egypt's democratization transition. Military intervention in the 
- I 
legislature, protestors' politi~al inexperience, and destabilized civil society disconnected 
I 
the new political structure from the protestors' goals. Ultithately, soccer unit~d Egyptians 
I 
. . ' . ' 
to demonstrate, but could not transfonri this infant civil so;ciety into a foimal political 
party. As a protest and outside-the-government tool, supp6rter groups could not enter a 
. - I . 
militarily governed system, which still dictated the terms for governance. 
, I . 
Following the 18-day occupation ofTahrir Square,! Hosni Mubarak resigned as 
I . 
president and gave transitional power to the SCAF for six 1months before elections would 
occur. SCAF Chairman Mohamed Tantawi became chief-of-state and subsequently 
dissolved the constitution to the demands of the protestors!. In the first step towards 
. . . - I . . 
democratization, the military held a constitutional referenqum, where 40% of the 
population turned out to vote 80% iri. favor of the modifications. Yet over the next six 
months, an' onslaught of protests continued to demand clarity and justice for former 
regime merribers. This frustration grew over the SCAF's faih.ire to follow protestor 
demands. Between February 2011 and the presidential elections in June 2012, the interim 
government polled Egyptians five times, causing election-fatigue (Mayton). Also, the 
military had a strong presence in the constitution-writing process through a military-
appointed constituent assembly. The presidential elections occurred in a hostile, skeptical 
environment that was characterized by poverty, unemployment, and insecurity. Egypt's 
Presidential Election Committee, which was created by the military-interim government, 
disqualified ten contenders, including three popular candidates, from the race. 5 Hundreds 
5 The three popular candidates included Hazem Abu Ismail (Salafist N our Party), Omar 
Suleiman (National Democratic Party), and Khaled AI Shater {The Brothers, the Freedom 
and Justice Party). The Committee disallowed Ismail's candidacy because his mother 
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of thousands demonstrated after these decisions .and the young revolutionaries worried 
their democratization was only theoretical(Araim). 
By May 23rd 2012, the first round of elections saw three candidates come out on 
top: Mohammad Morsi (Muslim Brotherhood) and Ahmed Shafiq (Mubarak:'s last Prime 
Minister), withHamdeen Sabbahi, the favorite·ofthe young revolutionaries, soon falling 
to the side(Araim). With the Muslim Brotherhood's dominance of the People's 
Assembly, Morsigained additional support from his platforms on social justice, charity, 
and Islamic values. While not active participants in the revolution, the Muslim 
Brotherhood acquired votes from "well-organized political activities, including assistance 
programs for the poor and their protests concerning human rights abuses, government 
repression, and manipulation to-undermine the democratization process" (Sarquis, p.887). 
By building social safety nets during authoritarianism, the Muslim Brotherhood garnered 
the votes to elect Mohammad Morsi as the new Egyptian president. In the first elections 
after the revolution, the Muslim Brotherhood, one of only forms of civil society under 
Mubarak: dedicated to community needs for over 30 years, swept the elections. Egyptian 
voters trusted an organization that, whilst Islamist, prioritized social welfare over 
political gain. 
Yet, before Morsi could declare ·himself victor, the SCAF abrogated power from 
both legislative and executive branches of Egypt's government. In a 'soft coup', SCAF 
invalidated the Peoples Assembly elections and dissolved both houses of parliament. 
Additionally, the military issued an interim constitution that granted themselves control 
over the prime minister, lawmaking, the national budget, and deClarations of war without 
oversight (Kirkpatrick). "Under these circumstances, both national and international 
analysts felt that either Morsi or Shafiq would represent only slight differences in 
practice, as the military would remain the real power behind the scenes" (Sarquis, p.893). 
The young revolutionaries deconstructed the hierarchal authoritarian structure only to 
witness the SCAF directlyinfluence.constitutionaland electoral comrriittees; as well as 
held dual citizenship, which violated the earlier constitutional amendment. As Mubarak's 
former chief of military intelligence, Suleiman, popular amongst Mubarak loyalists, fell 
shortofthe required amount of endorsements. AI Shater, leader ofthe Muslim 
Brotherhood, was disqualified because he served a jail sentence. (Golia) 
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control legislation. Without any strong progress towards democratization, Ultras raised 
questions over why the protestors could not access the Egyptian political system. 
With Egypt's exceptionally diverse demographics, soccer supporter groups could 
not gather the political clout to compete against mainstay institutions. While Ultras 
clearly did not want to construct policy, the young revolutionaries lacked the institutional 
history of the Muslim Brotherhood, the Mubarak regime, or the Egyptian military. Many 
protestors came from professional and powerful backgrounds with political knowledge 
and wealth. But, "no one has offered detailed, informal plans for institutional and 
economic restructuring. This is partly because [revolutionaries] lack key skills, including 
experience in participatory governance, which was simply never allowed" (Golia, p.23). 
The. revolutionaries needed politicatdevelopmentto accommodate diverse interest groups 
with cominon goals and a respect for the greater good. Political sociologists like Claus 
Offe and Danilo Zolo attribute democratic hardships with fragmented civil societies. "As 
a result of modernization, society has developed into a highly differentiated and 
fragmented set of subsystems which now make it impossible to bring it under the control 
of democratically elected representatives of 'the people'" (Nash, p.222). These 
subsystems clash under different social environments, divisions of labor, religious 
beliefs, and levels of trust between people. Many Egyptians trusted the Ultras to organize 
demonstrations and ignite social waves, but, as evidenced from the elections, few 
believed in the structural integrity of the revolutionaries' party. Traditional politicians 
won in controlling policy. Even though no populist organization could democratize with 
Egypt's authoritative military, soccer supporter groups contributed to the awakening of 
Egypt's civil society and civic participation. 
Ultras failed to change state policy from within, but the supporters launched 
successful accountability and transparency missions against soccer and political officials. 
Cairo's firms collectively outlined a! blacklist of counter-revolutionaries and people that 
accused the youth of being Egypt's, 'traitors'. Posted to the Internet, this list included · 
Hassan Shehata (Egyptian national coach) Hossan and Ibrahim Hassan (pro-Mubarak 
coaches ofZamalek)Samir Zaher (Director ofEFA), Ahmed Shoubeir (former Al-Ahly 
goalkeeper and TV personality), Hassan Hamdi (chairman of Al Ably) and others. This . 
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anti-corruption group included 250 sports personalities and representatives of the 
revolution. This group called for a military investigation of sports corruption during the 
Mubarak era (Amara, p.161). As a result, Zaherstepped down as director of the EFA 
with several pro,..Mubarak officials following-suit. The firms succeeded in restructuring 
Egypt's sports politics. 
Port Said Disaster: Military Intimidation 
During the election on February 1st 2012, Ultras suffered from mass causalities in the city 
of Port Said, raising questions on police/mllitary intimidation. During a match between 
Al-Ahly and Al-Masry, a violent outbreakbetween fans lead to 72 supporters dead and 
hundreds injured. With the crowds crushing individuals and weapons brandished, the 
police did not interfere but rather watched the event unfold, according to televised 
evidence. As a united group of supporters that coordinated communications and 
occupations, this aggressive behavior in the Al-Ahlawy section was uncharacteristic of 
the supporters, who usually stood against the authorities. Mohamed Hamoud, a goal-
scorer for Al-Masry, stated, "When the match was over supporters rushed on to the pitch 
and then the lights went off .. People didn't know who was who. I then saw people 
throwing the ~1 Ahly supporters from the stands" (Chulov). While the media accused 
Ultras of holding fireworks and weapons, Cairo's Ultras believed the police negligence 
and planting of aggressors was an intimidation tactic. The SCAF understood that the 
Ultras opposed the interim government and -had coordinated protests after the revolution 
(Elgohari, May 2013). Ultras White Knights and Ultras Yellow Dragons stood in 
solidarity with the victims of the disaster. Both Al-Ahlawy and Ultras White Knights 
agreed not to attend a friendly game, placing justice for Port Said first. Cairo's Ultras 
continued to demonstrate, but took a hiatus from its political presence to mollin its losses . 
. By March 11th 2012, a coalition of Cairo's firms issued a statement of solidarity 
to the interior ministry 8?d soccer authonties. This statement made six demands that 
stemmed from .the Port Said Disaster. The demands called for the just retribution for the 
victims, the end of fabricating evidence against the Ultras, no sports activities until 
achievement of the first goal, and releasing of all Ultra detainees. In their last two 
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demands, Ultras reaffirmed their rejection of all state coercive policies targeted at 
supporters, and that they would continue to sacrifice themselves for their country's 
freedom. Ultras blamed military intimidation and demanded that the SCAF hand over 
power to a civilian government. Ahmed Gamel Eldin, the interior minister, "asserted that 
Ultras members were patriots and should not engage in the political conflicts between the 
political forces in society" (Elgohari, May 2013, p.52). After days of teargas and protests, 
Egyptian courts reviewed the case and, in January 2013, sentenced 21 people to death.-
The decision triggered mixed reactions. Some Ultras felt betrayed by the courts, which 
convicted their fellow.Ultra members. Protests. broke out in Cairo, where 11 people died, 
including 2 policemen. Iri reaction to the justice system's decision, Ultras alienated 
themselves as agents for democratization, falling into the stereotyped category ofurban 
thuggery. 
Morsi' s Deposition and Ultras' Current Campaigns 
While Morsi's tried diminishing military authority and politica~ instability, supporter 
groups led grassroots campaigns to promote state accountability and citizen rights. While 
soccer has not inftltrated the government structure, it has changed citizens' perspectives 
on Egypt's justice system and on soccer's internal structure. As the military and Muslim 
Brotherhood battle for control of the state, soccer remains a battleground for the freedom 
of expression, justice, and individual empowerment.· Soccer's current battleground is set 
by Morsi's forced resignation and continuing Egypt's continuing transitional period. 
During the early months of Morsi' s rule, the president attempted to redistribute 
legislative and executive powers from SCAF control to assigned or previously elected · 
officials from the Muslim Brotherhood. Upon coming into offtce, Moisi found himself 
surrounded by the military officials, who had operated the interim government. While 
Islamists held around 70% of the parliamentary seats, the interim government suspended 
People's Assembly, declaring that one-third ofthe seats were illegitimate (Leyne, June. 
2012). On July gth 2012, Morsi ordered the dissolved parliament to reconvene, but; under. 
the new constitution, Egypt's Supreme Constitutional Court ruled against Morsi's order 
and stated that the SCAF held the power to reconstitute a new assembly (Leyne, July 
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2012). Within the state apparatus, Morsi attempted to reduce theSCAF's power by 
requesting Mohamad Tantawi, head of Egyptian armed forces, and Sami Anan, Armey 
chief of staff, to ·iesign. lh a televised event, Morsi stated, "I want the armed forces to 
·devote themselves-.io a mission.that is holy to .allofus, which is protecting the nation," 
(Londono). Many civilians viewed this action as the consolidation of Islamist power in 
government. As this power struggle between Morsi and the SCAF continued, liberal 
secularists viewed Morsi's actions as a return to authoritarian control. Zeinab Abul-
Magd, a history profes-sor at the American University in Cairo denounced, "Now, 
officially, it is a Brotherhood state. Now it is official they are in full control of state 
institutions" (Londono). 
On the one-year anniversary ofMorsi's inauguration,Egypt erupted with 
demonstrations, condemning Morsi 's increasingly authoritarian rule and negligence for 
the rule of law. Many Egyptians opposed the violent protests, either supporting Morsi or 
respecting the democratic process. On June 28th 2013, General Abdul Fatah al-Sisi 
suspended the constitution and deposed Morsi in a coup d'etat. Violent clashes between 
protestors and pro-'Morsi supporters ignited the streets of Egypt's urban areas. Within the 
week, the military propped up appointed Adly Mansour as interim president. The military 
bestowed to Mansour executive power_ in the Supreme Constitutional Court and the right 
to issue constitutional declarations; Mansour held the reins of executive, constitutional, 
and judicial powers. · The . SCAF enforced forceful security measures in their conflicts 
withpro-Morsi demonstrations; during one crackdoWn. onAugust 14th2013, 683 people 
were killed according to the Egyptian Health Ministry (Fahim). 
Unlike in the 2011 revolution, Ultras were not organizing political entities in the 
deposition of Morsi: Firms did not overtly state their allegiances to a particular side. The 
protests after the Port Said court decision tarnished their image as fighters for justice. 
Nonetheless, supporter-groups maintained their anti-police message and still defend the -
interests of their members. In November 2013, -Al Ably supporters marched by the 
thousands to the interior ministry, demanding the release of25 detained supporters. These 
detained supporters were welcoming their handball team home at the airport when police 
deployed teargas to manage the crowd. Khaled Abu Qiraa, an Al-Ahlawy member, 
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declared, "We have come here today to send a message to say free those who are 
imprisoned, free the,oppressed, rescue us from the tyranny of the interior ministry. We 
say to the court and to the state, free our oppressed sons, free the youth against whom you 
fabricated a case" ("AI Ably football fans march through Cairo demanding detainee 
release"). Additionally, Egypt's soccer politics remain tense and closed for political 
expression. In AI Ably's African Champion's League final match against Orlando 
Pirates, Ahmed Abdul-Zaher celebrated after scoring a winning goal, by raising a pro-
Morsi four-finger sign for 'Rabaa'. This gesture represents the Rabaa El-Adaweyah 
Square march that opposed the military's removal of former President Morsi. After the 
match, Zaher was suspended indefinitely and condemned by current sports minister Taber 
Abu Zeid as having issued a "grave insult" (Salah). At the beginning of next season, 
fellow players and Al Ably supporters plan to protest the suspension: 
Conclusion 
Through the coordination of social movements~ Egyptian Ultras have :strengthened· 
domestic civil society and pushed for the state's further.democratization~·From 2011-
2014, Egypt has transformed from an authoritarian regime to a plebicitarian autocracy,· 
where elected officials' actions were not checked by other institutions, and then back to 
an 'emergency' military-rule. The country's democratization remains in a transition 
period as a moving target. As typically apolitical groups, the frrrils never intended to 
pursue policy-making roles in the new government. These organizations united Egypt's 
clashing demographics in a revolution against ·corruption, police brutality, economic 
imbalances, and authoritarianism. While Egyptians still struggle to· see the fruit of their 
demonstrations, Ultras maneuver-bureaucratic waters and act as the populace's voice. 
"The struggles of social movements are radically plural since they involve a multiplicity 
of identities and political sites; in this way, they also mitigate for the extension of 
'liberty' to new groups of citizens" (Mouffe, 1988, found in Nash, p.246).Uitras became 
Egypt's political outsiders, built on trust and passionate unity. 
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Al-Ahlawy members calling for justice over the Port Said victims (Oliver Weiken/EPA, 
2013) 
Ahmed Abdul-Zaher displaying the pro-Morsi 'Rabaa' sign after scoring against Orlando 
Pirates (Sport's Illustrated, 2013) 
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Carsi members hijacked a bulldozer to break through police barricades (Wikimedia) 
A side-by-side comparison of Turkish and American CNN during Gezi Riots 
(OccupyGezi Tumblr) 
44 
4. Turkey's Search for Modern Kemalist Democracy: Soccer and Gezi 
Park 
Turkey's stronger civil society had a greater initial impact on democratization compared 
to Egypt. Over 75% of Turkish citizensare active soccer fans (Batuman, p.691). In a 
survey by sociologist Ahmet Talimciler, 63% of citizens prioritized their team below 
'only their family and nation'' and 30% labeled their team ··more important than anything 
else (Batuman, p.691). Asa cornerstone of the country'slifestyle, soccer joins together 
Turkey's ethnically diverse population with supporter groups, and it divides people 
between team allegiances. Istanbul's three main teams, Galatasaray, Fenerbahce, and 
Besiktas, continually battle for supremacy on the pitch, -and in the streets. For decades, 
supporter groups have protested in the streets and clashed with police forces~ However, 
the Gezi Park protests in the 2013 summer were different. 
When Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan announced that Istanbul's last 
central green:.space, Gezi Park, would be replaced by a shopping mall, environmentalists 
occupied the park and Istanbul residents expressed frustration ·with this proposal. Upon 
the -riot police's use of excessive force t~ evict occupiers, Turkey's democratization 
movement began in Gezi Park. Prot€;stors called for greater state accountability, 
decentralization of Prime Minister powers, and the end of discriminatory p~licies ·against 
Turkey's oppressed minorities. In the thick of organizing the occupation and street 
fighting, Istanbul's united Ultras-alleviated the fear of demonstrators and participated in 
the state's democratization. As an establish~d civil society group, some firms saw the 
political message to represent an open, diverse, and accepting community. This openness 
to ethnic, religious, and gender heterogeneity ~ountered previous Ke~alist modes of 
governance. In essence, Turkish protestors and Ultras espoused a progressive ideology 
that updated and democratized Kemalism. 
In this case study, I will argue that the civil society of Turkish-soccer abetted the 
Gezi Park protests and the demand for a modem Kemalist democracy. Moreover, I will 
compare Turkey's accomplishments in democratization to the earlier case_ study of Egypt. 
This_ argument wi~l cover five sections. First, Turkey's historicalregime oscillations show 
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the military and people's dedication.to upholding Kemalist ideals. Second, Besiktas' 
Ultras, 'Carsi', have anti-political and leftist beliefs that encourage progressive political 
participation. Third, before the protests, this anti-commercialist, secularist, and 
progressive sentiment grew in Ultra~, environmentalist, and liberal communities. Fourth, 
Carsi and other firms joined together to demand .accountability in Erdogan's regime, 
greater citizen participation in city projects, and political inclusion of Turkey's 
. - . . . . 
minorities. Fifth, political demonstrations continue on the street and in the stadium, with 
increasing signs of progressive dem9cratization. 
20th Century Turkish Democracy 
Since the fall of the Ottoman Empir~, Turkish democracy has been a work in progress. In 
the .past century, Turkey survived six political transition periods: the Committee ofUnion 
and Progress (CUP) revolution in 1Q08, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk's formation of the 
Turkish Republic, and military coups in 1960, 1971, 1980, and 1997. Turkey experienced 
'regime oscillations' between military authoritarian rule, competitive electoralism6 and 
democracy (Sozen, 2010). Through ,these regime oscillations, the state and military's 
' . 
priority of Turkey's independence from foreign interference remained constant. Yet two 
main problems hindered Turkey's ~11 democratization: military interference in politics 
and the oppression of opposition mqvements. This section will briefly outline both the 
. . 
history of Turkish democracy and th.e impact ofKemalism, as a political ideology. Both 
are critical in understanding current pemocratization movements. 
After the failed efforts of Sultan Abdullamid II, the Committee of Union and 
I . - , . . • 
Progress .(CUP) led a constitution-writing movement in 1908. Labeled as the 'Young 
Turks', ~is group of young, educated bureacrats deposed the Sultan and pushed for 
nationalist reforms to the Ottoman Empire. When Turkey sided with the Central Powers 
in WWI, the CUP government witnessed its land in the Balkans, Arabia, and the Levant 
dissolve into independent states after the war ended in defeat. Since Germany's.demise 
appeared imminent, Turkey wanted to survive as an independent state, rather than as an 
" . 
6 As a hybrid form of democracy, competitive electoralism is where "fair, free, and 
competitive elections [occur] with inclusive suffrage" (Sozen, 2010, p.3). However, the 
state holds greater power over citizens' freedoms whilst in office. 
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European subsidary (Kalaycioglu). At the Battle of Gallipoli, General Mustafa Kemal 
defeated the invading British force and established himself as a military and folk hero. By 
1923, Mustafa Kemal 'Ataturk' (meaning father of the Turks) led the War of 
Independence and created Turkey's first republic. 
Among Ataturk's many reforms of the government7, he instilled Kemalism, a 
ideology that still dominates Turkish politics. Based on the need to maintain Turkish 
independence and sovereignty, Kemalism comprises of six arrows: republicanism, 
populism, secularism, nationalism, statism, and reformism (Mango). Republicanism 
originates in Turkey's movement away from Ottoman sultanate towards a Western style 
republic. Populism calls for the transfer of political power to citizenship, where the state 
serves the people's interest. With the abolishment of the Caliphate, Turkish secularism 
ended religious influence over government action. Following the creation of the Turkish 
republic, Ataturk used a singular nationalist identity to unite Turks within its borders. 
Statism prioritizes economic and technological development after years of stagnated 
innovation and scientific process. Reformism called for the abandonment of Turkish 
traditions for modernization; this process included changes to the alphabet from Arabic to 
Latin and 'Western' fashion protocol (such as the banning of the Fez). 
As noted above, the Kemalist arrow of nationalism was instituted to use identity 
to define the nation. Ataturk's notion of ethno-religious homogenity in Turkey meant that 
all Jews, Kurds, Armenians, Christians, Muslims were Turkish. Multiple identities could 
not flourish in the wake of Turkish nationalism. Schools forbade Kurdish language 
instruction, the state banned Sufi Islamic practices, and the government did not formally 
recognize the Kurds as an ethnic group. Ataturk's disregard for ethnic and religious 
variety began a long period of suppressing opposition movements. Even after Ataturk's 
death in 1938, state officials and the military upheld Kemalist principles and glorified his 
ur 
'saving' of Turkish independence. As the model for 
the republic, Kemalism remains the spine of 
Turkish politcs. 
eeks, the abolition of the Sultanate, abetting Kurdish 
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Yet, while Ataturk promoted the 'republican' state, his reforms were not fully 
democratic. Even though the Turkish Republic formed in 1923, the government did not 
hold competitive elections until1950. With Ataturk's Republican People Party (RPP) 
having single-party rule for 27 years, the Democratic Party (DP) came into power as a 
populist and civilationalist party. DP strengthened its po~ition by bolstering its 
Department of Censorship and imprisoning writers of opposition newspapers. DP 
loosened Kemalist secularist laws, reopening mosques and legalizing the Arabic call to 
prayer. By 1960, the Turkish military judged that DP was turning the republic into an 
Islamist elected authoritarian state ("Timeline: A history of Turkish coups"). On May 
27'h, the military staged a coup d'etat and executed Prime Minister Adnan Menderes. As 
the 'guardian ofKemalism' ("Turkey: Army will not get involved in Politics"), the 
. military amended the constitution, which reduced the ·executive branch's power over the 
judiciary. The amendments incorporated military powers into political influence and 
reaffirmed the separation of religion and state; the 1960 coup balanced powers in the 
federal government and gave greater civil liberties to minorities. 
But the military involvement clauses prompted the 1971 coup, where the armed 
forces blamed poor economic development on the lack of "strong and credible 
goveinment... inspired by Ataturk's· views" ("Timeline: A history of Turkish coups"). 
Throughout the 1970s, political instability continued with 11 different Prime Ministers 
and rising tensions between the socialist left and Islamist right. By -1980, the military -
intervened to halt violent clashes involving the nationalist organization Grey Wolves, 
socialist 'Devrimci Vo', the Kurdish separatist group PKK, and others. During martial 
rule, thousands were tortured and executed as opponents to the state. Following the third ·. 
coup, conservativism strengthened in Turkish politics and surmounted in the 1997 'soft-
coup'.· After years of growing Islamist parties, the military made recommendations to the 
government, which PM Necmettin Erbakan accepted and resigned. 
Throughout all post-Ottoman transitions, the agents of change emphasized state 
accountability, secularism and decentralized executive power. While the military 
maintained a Kemalist plan for the government, the frequency of their interyentions 
fragmented political compromise, bipartisanship; and respect for electoral process. 
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Currently, Turkey holds free, fair elections and. there is diminshed military power in the 
civilian constitutional amendments after the 1997 transition. Yet, the Civilian visions for 
Turkish democracy mirror some Kemalist ideals that stem from the previous transitions. 
Modem Turkish democratization movements search for a modem Kemalism in the wake 
of past reforms. 
Istanbul's Pre-revolutionary Ultras 
After the 1980 coup, Turkish firms emerged out of violent political factions. In a divided 
time of the Republic, soccer supporter groups represented so ley the interests of their 
community. Istanbul's three main clubs, Galatasaray SK, Fenerbache SK, and Besiktas 
Jimnastik Kulubu (BJK), vehemently opposed each other's team, firm, and 
neighborhood. "Istanbul teams were enmeshed in a gang-like feud, characterized by 
clandestine raids, lynchings and street battles" (Batuman, p.687). Supporters of all 
Istanbul clubs fought inside the Inonu Stadium for the 'curva' seating during a period 
known as the "Inonu War". Additionally, not all firms of the same club-agreed 
ideologically. Galatasaray's two main firms were the conservative, nationalist UltrAslan 
and leftist Tek Yumruk, which meant 'Single Fist' (Kuhn). On the Asian side oflstanbul, 
Fenerbahce had various leftist firms, including Kill For You, UniFeb, and Gene 
Fenerbahceliler. While BJK has politically diverse groups now, Besiktas started with one 
anti-authority group named Carsi. Since the 1980s, Carsi, meaning 'Marketplace', has 
become arguably the most-influential supporters group in Turkey. During the divided 
1980s, Carsi developed the characteristics of a political party, where representatives were 
invited to parliament and held political rallies.- Along with UltraAslan and several 
Fenerbahce firms, Carsi negotiated a truce between rival firms in the 1990s. 
_Within its maze-like neighborhood, Carsi is the nucleus of inclusive discussion 
and solidarity movements. The Ultras' membership is open to all races, beliefs, religions, 
and ethnicities. One student named Deniz stated, "All kinds of people are in Carsi. 
Professors, doctors, street children ... " (Batuman, p.689). Their mission embraces "values 
like anti-racism, anti-nationalism, anti-capitalism, anti-all-those-things, that took football 
from what it originally was: a simple game for all, regardless of the color of your skin, 
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the country you. live in, or the amount of cash you have in your pocket" (Kuhn, p.162). 
When BJK star Pascal Nouma received racial abuse from opposing fans because of his 
French-Senegalese origin, Carsi displayed a banner stating, "We are all black". When 
opponents taunted a BJK manager who's father had been a janitor, Carsi made a banner 
declaring, "We are all janitors"~ When astronomers decided that Pluto was no longer a 
planet, Carsi raised a banner announcing, "We are all Pluto" (Batuman, p.690). This 
dedication to group solidarity translates to their internal structure; Carsi boasts no 
. hierarchy, no leaders, no elections, and no official meetings. However, an inner circle of 
'Big Brothers' exists and coordinates outreach programs (visits to children hospitals, 
senior homes, and blood drives) and the gameday spectacles. Their inner circle has an 
Armenian public spokesman: Alen Markaryan. Appearing on television shows, at · 
university talks, and more; Markaryan speaks on behalf of his· supporters group and the 
nighborhood. With an Armenian figurehead in Turkey, Carsi has created a· truly 
democratized association of civil society. 
Their anti:.politics stance makes Carsi political ideology a moving target that 
occasionally contradicts itself. Carsi member, Alaatin Cam stated, "As you 'live longer, 
you have to turn your back on things you used to believe in. You change your identity. 
Carsi isn'tfascist, so it doesn't resist those changes" (Batuman, p.699). The Ultras have 
marched for environmentalist, Marxist, anarchist, gender equality, and ethnic equality 
causes. While Carsi maintains its platform as ' apolitical', the firm has become politically 
consolidated in liberal thought.8 Since the Ultras mirror the left-leaning voter 
demographics of the Besiktas neighborhood, Carsi is the microphone . for the 
community's beliefs in demonstrations. Yet, in Turkish politics, Carsi's more open 
attitude towards Armenians, Kurds, and women opposes traditional Turkish political 
ideology. The firm's diversity contradicts the Kemalist pillar of 'nationalism', where all 
citizens were nationalized Turks. In the past century, Kemalist nationalism flourished as 
an ideology; the state suppressed opposition parties, like Kurdish separatists, socialists, 
Greek Cypriots, ·and people that questioned the government. However, through inclusive 
8 Carsi has a conservative branch that" ~ies for power, but this part does not gather the 
same ground force support in political rallies (Kuhn). 
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discussion and civic participation, Carsi became a stronghold for the Ttrrkish ·state's · 
. opponents. Civil society within Carsi and other Ultra groups reinforces society's 
openness to a heterogenous Turkish identities. 
The Lead Up to the Taksim Protests . 
As Besiktas supporters and the police clashed in the streets, tensions between PM 
Erdogan's Justice and Development Party (AKP) and opposition parties heightened over 
commercial, religious, and political issues. In the months leading to the Gezi Park riots, 
both opponents to. the AKP and Besiktas' Ultras displayed deep frustration with 
Erdogan's evolution into semi-authoritarian leadership. Over his eleven-year period in 
office and three successful elections, PM Erdogan became increasingly Islamist and 
controlling of legislation (Sozen, 2013; Bila; Dorsey, June 2013). Erdogan swept three 
elections and moved to establish a more one-party rule within parliament. Between 2011 
and 2013, his government passed alcohol retail bans onuniversity campuses, city streets, 
and from within 100 meters of a mosque or school. Additional Islamist policies banned 
advertising for alcohol and made the 'morning after' pill a prescription drug. With almost 
no limits on his executive power, Erdogan heavily influenced constitutional courts and 
the police force. Both institutions targeted opponents of the state and enacted censorship 
laws. Out of 179 states, Turkey's "freedom of speech" ratio ranked 154th, with more 
incarceratedjouinalists than Iran and China combined (Dorsey~ June 2013). The 
Department of Censorship monitored programs on TV, in newspapers, and online (Bila). 
Furthermore, Erdogan:' s regime launched ongoing attacks on minority groups, by purging 
them from positions of power and imprisoning them in massive amounts (Sozen, 2013). 
Months before the protests, Carsi Ultras witnessed Erdogan's overbearing police 
tactics on the general community ofBesiktas. On May 181 2013, identified as 'May Day' 
or 'Labor Day', Besiktas erupted with violence between leftist labor advocates, Carsi, 
and mob police. Two weeks later, after BJK's last league match, Ultras marched back to 
Besiktas by the thousands. The police judged that the supporters rallied too close to 
Erdogan' s office in Besiktas and the two sides clashed. Many fans left injured from the 
use of police teargas, riot batons, and tanks. Italian sociologists, Alessandro Dal 'Lago and 
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Rocco De Biasi noted; "The intensification of police control inside and outside the stadia 
led the Ultras to adopt a mode of mUitary organization and a warlike attitUde against the 
police. As a result, football hooliganism qua social problem has to be regarded as the 
legacy of such policing" (Dorsey, June 2013). Adamantly against the Erdogan 
administration, Carsi sided with the environmentalists when the. Prime_ Minister 
threatened Gezi Park in Taksim Square. 
In May 2013, PM Erdogan revealed city plans to replace Gezi Park with a 
commercial mall. Located in the sociopolitical center of Istanbul and Turkey, Gezi Park 
stood as the last green space in the city's center: The city plans mirrored Erdogan's 
neoliberal commercialism, which spent state funds on elite condominium projects, grand 
malls, and construction developments. Activists realized that the government treated 
public space as a commodity, and began occupying the park on May 28th. This 
occupation reinforced the presence of people in the public landscape. Two days later, on 
May 31 8\ police entered the park, burned tents, sprayed teargas, used water canons, and 
beat occupiers. Within hours, protestors of all backgrounds and Ultras stormed Taksim . 
and Besiktas square, demanding the :liberation of the park and of their government. 
The Gezi Park Movement: The People's demands for Progressive Politics 
Following the police extradition ofGeziPark occupiers, protestors marched against the 
AKP and police. In solidarity with the occupiers and fellow aggravated· citizens, men and · 
women faced the full force of Turkish riot police, including teargas, pepper gas, water · 
canons, tanks, rubber bullets, hand weapons and sonic canons. In this unexpected protest, 
Ultras acted spontaneously on social media, reaching out to other supporter group 
networks. Even though Istanbul's numerous firms have vastly different political views 
(ranging from conservative nationalist to Marxist), Ultras united in a consolidated effort 
to reinforce the people's power and end police brutality. Unlike Egypt's rival, but 
ideologically similar firms, the three. most involved ·groups were nationalist UltrAslan · 
(Galatasaray), Vamos Bien (Fenerbahce) and leftist Carsi (BJK). Exchanging jerseys and 
strategies, these firms breached the intense rivalry between clubs because all supporters 
were needed to impact the riots ("Supporter groups on Istanbul's three major teams join 
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forces for Gezi Park"). United on the front lines, Istanbul's Ultras built courage among 
less-experienced protestors. They were crucial in the first few days of protest. An 
anonymous protestor said, "[The Ultras] were always in front when police used gas. They 
really helped those not used to facing such thirigs. They protected them".(Jones). In 
Besiktas, supporters transported demonstrators in massive fan buses and trucks past. 
teargas launchers, noise bombs, and water canons (Hobbs). In order to block police 
vehicle advances, Ultras helped build barricades using abandoned cars, fences, and 
various street items~ After days ofriots, Carsi members hijacked a bulldozer and broke 
police bairiers to give protestors complete access frorri Besiktas to Taksim Square. Bagis 
Erten, sports reporter for NTV Spor, declared, "It was a critical moment. Supporters of all 
the big teams united for the first time againstpolice violence. They were more 
experienced than the protestors, they fight them regularly. Their entry raised the 
protestor's morale and they played aleading role" (Dorsey, June 2013). The riots spread 
around the country to Izmir, Trabzon, and the capital Ankara. In a physical and practical 
sense, the Ultras brought the gunpowder to the duel an_d crucially helped protestors 
occupy Taksim Square. 
In a theoretical sense, Carsi and other groups applied the democratic ideals of 
participatory governance and equal rights to the protest's mission. The strength of . 
supporter groups' civil society translated into the protestors' ethnic, religious, and 
gender-inclusionary agenda. Gezi Park became a safe haven for free expression and open 
discussion of homosexuality, nationalism, capitalism, minority rights, and religion 
(Hobbs). By giving people free access to political discussion, the protestors re-imagined 
Turkey's future. A membe_r of the Tek Yumruk ~irm (Galatasaray) stated, "The important 
thing that I find about Gezi Park is. that so many people who used to be opposed to one 
another are now talking openly about creating a new Turkey" (Hobbs). The occupation 
taught the democratic principles of citizenship and equal political rights. While the riots 
started as an opposition to Erdogan's semi-authoritarian rule, issues of Kurdish, 
Armenian; Alevi, LGBTQ, and women's rights emerged from these discussions. People 
decorated Taksim Square with protest posters, rainbow flags, and· humorous messages. 
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Protestors blasted Erdogan's TV censorship of the riots.9 In order to make democratized 
political change, the occupiers reached out to the authorities with a Tak:sim Solidarity 
Press Release. Protestors demanded that Gezi would remain a park, governors and the 
chief of police should be removed from office, teargas should be banned, all detained 
protestors freed, bans on freedom of speech should be lifted, and peaceful demonstrations 
should be allowed. Moreover, the leaders of the movement outlined whom they 
represented: 
"The wish for peace, 'and resistance to the·war politics being played in our country 
and in the region; the sensitiyities of Alevi citizens; the rightful demands of the 
victims of urban tninsformatlon projects; the voices raised against the 
conservative male politics that control women's bodies; the resistance to the 
coercion against universities, judicial branch, and artists; the demands of all 
workers, starting with the employees of Turkish Airlines, against the 
appropriation of their rights; the struggle against discrimination based on sexual 
orientation and gender identity; and the demands for the clearing of the way for 
citizen's right of access to education and healthcare" (Tak:sim Solidarity Press 
Release). 
Influenced by different kinds of civil society, the protestors wanted a democratized state 
that was accountable for its citizen's political rights. Strong civil society shaped this 
progressive mindset towards Turkey's div.erse demographics. Furthermore, the protestors 
advocated for a modem version of Kemalist democracy or progressive Kemalisrri. They 
pushed for other Kemalist arrows but turned against 'nationalism'. By. demanding both 
. ' 
the separation of religion and state and a more Western style of governance, the 
protestors decried Erdogan's Islamist control over executive and legislative power. They 
called for a balance of powers with checks on one-party rule. However, their progressive 
Kemalism did not satisfyAtaturk's affirmation of single-identity 'nationalism'. Ataturk 
instituted policies of 'homogeneity' in order to preserve the independence of the new 
Turkish Republic. Yet, the oppression of diverse groups like the Alevis, Kurds, and 
Armenians did not satisfy the preconditions for an inclusive democratic republic. The 
Turkish state's suppression of opposition groups continued, even in the face of public 
9 On the first night of the demonstrations, CNN Turk showed a documentary on penguins 
instead of the breaking news. Many blasted the media for silencing the protest and falling 
prey to state pressure. Ultras made it their revolutionary symbol. Similar to the previous 
joke iterations, Carsi printed shirts saying, "We are all penguins" (Kates). 
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protest. However, the Gezi Park riots were the first time where regular citizens joined . 
with opposition groups ina democratization movement. Around Turkey, state officials 
. witnessed a democratization movement transform into a progressivere-imagining of 
Turkish politics. 
Prime Minister Erdogan' s Reforms and Democratic Investigations 
Following weeks of protest, city officials negotiated with protest leaders and Ultra 
members. Erdogan promised constitutional changes that would assist impoverished 
minority communities. On September 30th 2013, Erdogan introduced a 'liberalization 
package of reforms'. These reforms focused repealing policies influenced by Kemalist 
notions ofhomogeneity. It lifted the headscarfban on women serving in public office 
(except when in uniform). The reforms abolished the 'nationalist student pledge', which 
forced all primary school children, regardless of ethnicity, to say they are "honest, hard-
working Turks" (Letsch, September 201.3). Erdogan suggested lowering the election 
threshold for political parties to enter parliament from 10% to 5% of votes. This change 
would allow smaller and minority parties to enter government, giving political 
accessibility to Kurdish parties. But the reforms failed to address other pressing subjects, 
like the ban on Kurdish instruction in public schools, Alevi cultural rights, and the anti-
terrorist laws that criminalize Kurdish politicians in the PKK. In reference to Erdogan' s 
lifting of the ban on letters 'q,' 'w,' and 'x' in Kurdish village names, Professor Koray 
Caliskan stated, "[Erdogan's] package is completely cosmetic. [He] gave more freedom 
to three letters than he did to 10 million Kl.rrds in Turkey. What about more local 
· autonomy that Kurds have been waiting for?" (Letsch, September 2013). Evidently, the 
reforms represented a small step towards democratization and expansive citizenship 
rights. 
Questions over the legitimacy ofErdogan's administration surfaced following an 
independent investigation of the government. On December 27tlt 2013, a high-profile 
corruption scandal identified the head of a state-owned bank, the sons of cabinet 
ministers, and leading businessmen as perpetrators of corruption crimes. Following the 
arrests, Erdogan removed half of his cabinet, senior police officers, and judicial officials 
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(Letsch, December 2013). Thousands protested and called for Erdogan's resignation after 
the forced removal of officials. During a December match, Fenerbahce supporters· 
chanted against the state's interference in the investigation. The Ultras called their Prime 
Minister a thief and then raised a banner saying, "Everywhere is bribery, everywhere is 
corruption" ("Fenerbahce turns league game into anti-gov't rally"). Sezgin Tanrikulu, 
deputy head of the People's Republican Party (CHP) said, "I have never come across 
such blatant government meddling with judiciary before. This is highly worrying. The 
little trust that people had left in the Turkish justice system is·now gone" (Letsch, -
December 2013). As of now, the military remains neutral in the investigation. Many 
liberal citizens hope that the continuing investigation· will perpetrate instigators of police 
brutality and undemocratic practices: 
Conclusion 
After years of Islamism and growing authoritarianism, Turkey's soccer firms applied the 
democratic principles in civil society to the GeziPark democratization movement. Ultras' 
open membership and free expression epitomized the citizenship values of the 
occup.ation. Not only did Carsi and other firms provide the street-fighting knowledge to 
defend public landscapes, these supporter groups united together and with other interest 
groups to protest Erdogan's centralized power. They advocated for equal-membership in 
the realm of Turkish politics. The Gezi Park protestors promoted progressive Kemalism, 
which affirmed political secularism and equal citizenship for Turkey's diverse 
population. During these protests, Tlirkey transitioned from a delegative democracy, 
where legislative/judicial oversight of the executive branch did not exist, to an imperfect 
democracy. Within Turkey's strong civil society came a strong democratization 
movement that continues to grow and change. 
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5. Conclusions when Comparing Cases 
No state in the Middle East is dose to a-perfect democracy. Even Turkey, a model for the 
Islamic world's democracies, suffers from violations of basic freedoms and internal 
discord. Following the Arab Spring and Gezi Park protests, Egypt and Turkey continue to 
struggle with this 'third wave of democratization'. The countries continually face 
bureaucratic obstacles, opposing demands, and military/executive intervention in 
judiciary processes. But, the success of political transitions varies across each state's 
situational context. The numerous complexities in Egypt's revolution make comparing 
with Turkey's demonstrations without excessive qualifications. Both cases involved 
multi-dimensional motives, different actors, and historical conditions that influenced the 
movements. However, one can apply democratic and sociological theories to the two case 
studies at a high level of abstraction. The analysis of each case's theoretical implications 
allows for a comparative study of Egypt and Turkey. 
In both countries, the populace engaged in a social movement to decentralize the 
state's executive power. Protestors confronted authoritarian or semi-authoritarian 
regimes, -which were not limited by judicial or legislative oversight. While the goals of 
the movements differed respectively,both demanded greater public participation in 
government and the democratic values of citizenship. The guiding forces behind these 
revolutions were associativ-e connections in civil society. Michael Walzer said, "The 
civility that makes democratic politics possible ·can only be learned in the associational 
networks; the roughly equal and widely dispersed capabilities that sustain the networks 
have to be fostered by the democratic state" (Walzer, p.302). Protestors learned principles 
of democracy in civil society groups, which taught respect for political multiplicity, 
social trust, and openness to diversity. Y oi.mg Egyptian revolutionaries deposed a 30-year 
authoritarian by usingtheir civil society's network and communication apparatuses. 
Turkish protestors united many different interest groups'that felt collectively suppressed 
by the AKP administration. But the outcomes of each case differed significantly. Egypt's 
SCAF intervention in Morsi's deposition, rewriting of the constitution, and the 
suspension of parliament has divided the country. On the other hand, Turkey will hold 
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elections in 2015 and makes small steps to equal citizenship for minorities. This leads. to 
the question of why did Egypt democratize to a lesser degree than Turkey? 
After analyzing both cases, I affirm that s~onger civil society leads to s~onger 
democratization mov~ments. The outcomes of Egyptian and Turkish movements stem 
from the _country's different placemt:?nt on the spectrum of democratized governments and 
different levels of civil society. Following a century of mili~ary coups, exchanges of · 
power, and the project of establishing a republic, the Turkish state has undergone a slow 
modernization and _democratization process since its independence. While opposition 
groups and outspoken media sources experience _suppressive policies, Turkish citizens 
maintain the right to participate in a~sociative. networks and political multiplic.ity. 
Turkey's stronger civil and political: society meant that vastly different groups ofpeople 
joined together to articulate a strong message of democratization. Environmentalists, 
conservatives, Jslamists, socialists, . ~d many others openly discussed their mission as 
protestors and made compromises to satisfy different interests. This open interaction 
socially embedded the democratization movement, which pressured politicians to change 
policies or risk an election loss. Turkey's. political and societal stability enabl~d the 
adaptation of a political ideology into modem circumstance; the protestors established . 
progressive ~emalist practice into their movement. In Egypt's revolution; Egyptians 
engaged in the first fair elections with any resemblance of democracy, since their 1956 
independence. However, the post-Mubarak transitional period l~cked the transparency 
and accountability requested by the revolutionaries. Balanced legislative and judicial 
branches were non-existent in the checking of the SCAF's control over federal 
operations. Unlike Turkey's recent history of fair,_ free, and frequent elections, Egyptian , 
citizens could not hold the state responsible for undemocratic actions~ Furthermore, under 
Mubarak, Egyptian civil society co~sisted ofreligiousinstitutions and eventu~lly soccer. 
supporter groups. While Egypt's infant civil society coordinated an enormous occupation, 
diverse interest groups did not unite,in pressuring both military and Morsi for 
democratization~ The young revolutionaries lacked the capabilities to influence policy-
making. Egyptians did not trust Morsi's confidence in parliament and violently turned 
against their elected leader. The purpose of democracy is not to represent one interest, but 
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multiple voices that often conflict with each other. Strong civil society creates greater 
communication between alternative interests in the forms of open discussion, political 
participation, and coordination of wide-scale protests. 
Finally, soccer played a crucial role in both Egypt and Turkey's democratizations. 
The supporter groups establish 'thin trust' and bolster an individual's commitment to the 
community's greater good. As opponents to police and media authorities, firms are civil 
society groups whose anti-political beliefs make them hotspots for social activism. In 
both countries, Ultras applied strong organizational skills, street-fighting knowledge, and 
messages of solidarity to aid the movements. They provided the muscle to the revolutions 
and transformed their anti-political stance into an almost nationalist position; they fought 
for the betterment of their country. In this -·reclamation' of political power, the Ultras 
occupied public space, by taking their battles from the stadium to the streets. By using the 
world's most popular sport as a platform, Ultras connected with thousands of members to 
communicate their democratic principles. These connections built a web of networks to 
spread information in uncontrolled avenues by the state. Soccer supporter groups still 
remain pivotal actors in their country's democratization. From the terraces to the front 
lines, Egypt and Turkey's Ultras strengthened their country's civil society and sparked-
revolutionary action. 
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Glossary 
AKP: A Turkish political party called the Justice and Development Party. Headed by Recep Tayyip 
Erdogan, the AKP has been in power since August 2002 as Istanbul's leading center-right socially 
conservative party. 
AI-Ahly: Egypt's most popular soccer team based in Cairo. Al-Ahly has won 126 official trophies (107 
domestic and 19 international) more than any other club in the world. 
AI-Ahlawy: Al-Ahly's most popular supporter group. Founded in 2007, Al-Ahlawy is notorious for strong 
community connections, pyrotechnic stadiu,m displays, and conflicts with the polic~. 
Besiktas JK: Located on the European side of Istanbul, Besiktas JK is Turkey's third most popular soccer 
team. Besiktas JK play in Inonu Stadium and wear the colors are black and white. BJK represent the 
neighborhood ofBesiktas and are also known·as the 'Black Eagles'. · 
Carsi: Besiktas JK's primary supporter group that has very close ties with their neighborhood and 
members. While Carsi members use the anarchist 'A' symbol in their name, this support group has no . 
political affiliation to any group. Carsi stat~s that it is an apolitical organization and that it focuses on social 
issues concerning its members. -
Curva: Another term for the terraces of a stadium. Behind the goals, these sections attract the most fervent 
of supporters and act as a symbol of working-class pride. The terraces have historically had the cheapest 
seats in most stadiums. 
EFA: Egyptian Football Association, the niain governing body of Egyptian football/soccer affairs. 
Fenerbahce SK: Located on the Asian side of Istanbul, Fenerbahce SKis Turkey's richest and second 
most popular club. . 
Firms: Also known as soccer supporter groups or Ultra groups. 
Galatasaray SK: Turkey's most popular soccer club from Istanbul. The soccer club originated from the 
prestigious French-speaking Galatasaray high-school. 
lslamism: Also known as political Islam, Islamism dictates that Islam should guide social, personal, and 
political life. Some conservative Islamists believe in the everyday and judicial application of Sharia law. 
See Kalacioglu, 2005 for more information. 
Kemalism: Inspired by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, Kemalism is the driving political ideology behind the 
establishment of the Turkish republic. There are six arrows/pillars to Kemalism: republicanism, populism, 
nationalism, secularism, statism, and reformism. 
SCAF: Supreme Council of Armed Forces is a governing body of elite military officers that acted as 
commanders ofthe Egyptian Armed Forces and as Egypt's interim government from 2011-2014. 
Supporter Groups: Also termed as firms or Ultras, soccer supporter groups operate as highly-organized 
associations that gather to ensure the promotion of their club's team~ In some examples, soccer supporter 
groups have a political or anti-politicalleaning that dictates the identity of supporter group and 
neighborhood. 
Ultras: Members of a Mediterranean soccer firm or supporter group. The term 'Ultras' comes from 
Sampdoria, Italy in 1969, but earlier supporter groups can be found in Hungary and Brazil (Kuhn). 
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Ultra White Knights: Zamalek SC's main supporter group that rivals Al-Ahlawy. Ultra White Knights 
contributed significantly to Egypt's 2011 revolution and are also known for clashes with police and tifo 
demonstrations. 
Zamalek SC: Egypt's second most popular soccer team from Cairo that had a strong rivalry with Al-Ahly. 
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